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Let’s be Reasonable Here: Why the ADA Will Not 
Ruin Professional Sports 
Michael Waterstone∗  
“As a society, we are so much better off with people like Casey Martin, 
who show us that heart is just as important as talent, who only want 
an opportunity to compete against the best in their profession.”1 
“We may not have a Tour at all. It may disappear.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many people are scared that the world of professional sports is 
facing a drastic, unwelcome change. Soon, basketball players are go-
ing to be wearing spring-loaded shoes. Every participant in a cham-
pionship race is going to have her own individual starting line. Quar-
terbacks are going to have on-the-field sign language interpreters. 
Umpires are going to have guide dogs. Finally, some professional 
golfers are going to be able to ride carts around golf courses, while 
the rest of the competitors walk. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) is either the culprit 
or the savior, depending on one’s point of view. Two recent federal 
cases have addressed the ADA’s application to professional sports. 
Casey Martin, a professional golfer whose disability prevents him 
from walking a full round of golf, sued the Professional Golf Associa-
tion (“PGA”) Tour for the right to use a golf cart in PGA competi-
tion. Ford Olinger, also a professional golfer with a disability, sued 
 
 ∗  Law Clerk to the Honorable Richard S. Arnold, United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit. B.A., University of California Los Angeles; J.D., Harvard Law School. The 
views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of my employer. The au-
thor would like to thank Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, for his advice on earlier drafts of this 
article, and T. Markus Funk, for going above and beyond the call of duty as a colleague and 
friend. Finally, this article is dedicated to Steven Griffith, whose courage provides constant mo-
tivation. 
 1. Jim Abbott, It’s Easy to Accommodate, GOLF WORLD, Feb. 20, 1998, at 92. 
 2. W. Kent Davis, Why is the PGA Teed Off at Casey Martin? An Example of How the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Has Changed Sports Law, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 42 
(1998) (quoting Arnold Palmer). 
5WAT-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1490 
the United States Golf Association (“USGA”), claiming he should 
be allowed to use a golf cart in U.S. Open competition. As things 
stand, Casey Martin has won his suit,3 whereas Ford Olinger has 
not.4 
Notwithstanding their different results, both of these cases held 
that the ADA applies to professional sports. Together, these two 
cases started outlining an approach by which this can happen. Apply-
ing the ADA to professional sports will be a difficult process, because 
professional sports contain unique qualities that will make for chal-
lenging cases. Although the Martin and Olinger decisions began the 
process, the approaches they use are insufficient to decide ADA cases 
involving professional sports in a fair and consistent manner. The 
Olinger case in particular comes dangerously close to establishing an 
overly deferential method of ADA review. 
This article will propose an analysis that a court can use when a 
professional athlete (or would-be athlete) requests a rule modifica-
tion from her league or association. In doing so it will use the statu-
tory framework of the ADA, precedents involving other industries, 
critical commentary, and the Martin and Olinger opinions them-
selves to outline an analytical approach that strikes a balance between 
the need to deal with professional sports’ uniqueness and the desir-
ability of treating sports the same as other industries. This approach 
will distinguish those rules that cannot be modified without funda-
mental change from those that can and discuss how a court should 
determine if an athlete’s proposed change should in fact be made. 
This article will further argue that as a matter of policy rigorous re-
view of these rule modification proposals is desirable. Many busi-
nesses and industries involve intense competition, and professional 
sports should not be separated from these areas in any blanket fash-
ion. Even accepting that the essence of professional sports  
involves preserving competition that is as “equal” as possible, prop-
 
 3. The Supreme Court recently accepted certiorari in Martin’s case. See PGA Tour, 
Inc. v. Martin, __ U.S. __, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000).  The Court will hear the case in the 2000–
2001 term. Casey Martin won below in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Martin v. PGA 
Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000). When the district court decision, Martin v. PGA 
Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998), is referred to it will be clearly stated. 
 4. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000). When the dis-
trict court decision, Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999), 
is referred to it will be clearly stated. At the time of publication, Ford Olinger had a petition 
for certiorari pending.  See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir.), peti-
tion for cert. filed,  68 U.S.L.W. 1551 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2000) (No. 00-434). 
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erly applying the ADA will protect that value. 
This article is divided into seven parts. Part II provides a brief 
background and overview of the ADA, and also discusses the basic 
purposes and organization of the ADA.  Part III presents the ADA’s 
“reasonable accommodations” statutory framework, explaining why 
the Title I “undue burden” and Title III “fundamental alterations” 
analyses are central to ADA cases involving professional sports. Part 
IV focuses on the Martin and Olinger decisions, discussing the man-
ner in which they were decided and how they differ from one an-
other. Part IV also demonstrates why neither of these cases provides 
an adequate form of analysis for addressing future cases involving 
disability discrimination in professional sports. Part V offers a pro-
posed method of analysis that will work in both the Title I and Title 
III contexts to properly address disability discrimination in profes-
sional sports. This proposed approach will strike the proper balance 
between recognizing and protecting what makes professional sports 
unique and ensuring that professional athletics do not receive an 
overly deferential ADA review. Part VI addresses the policy and 
normative issues in the discussion of the application of disability law 
to professional sports. Finally, Part VII concludes that the ADA can 
and should be applied to professional sports. 
II. ADA BASICS 
A. The Purposes and Organization of the ADA 
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990. It was intended to provide a 
clear national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities, to establish a clear standard for eliminat-
ing this discrimination, and to ensure that the federal government 
played a central role in enforcing these standards.5 In doing so the 
ADA invoked the full sweep of congressional authority, including 
Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to 
regulate commerce. This was done to address the major areas of dis-
crimination faced every day by people with disabilities.6 President 
Bush described the ADA as “the world’s first comprehensive declara-
 
 5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994). 
 6. See id. 
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tion of equality for people with disabilities.”7 In many ways the ADA 
has functioned well to meet its far-reaching goals, and in many re-
spects it is “the most significant civil rights legislation since the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.”8 In the ten years since its passage, individuals 
with disabilities have utilized the ADA to secure rights in employ-
ment,9 education,10 transportation,11 medical care,12 and other areas. 
The ADA is divided into five sections. This article will only dis-
cuss those that could likely affect professional sports: The Introduc-
tory Section, Title I, and Title III. The Introductory Section gives 
congressional findings and purposes, and establishes several defini-
tions used throughout the entire act.13 The findings make it clear 
that Congress viewed individuals with disabilities as an isolated and 
segregated group that has been subject to various forms of discrimi-
nation, both intentional and unintentional.14 In enacting the ADA, 
Congress set the nation’s goals regarding individuals with disabilities 
as assuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent 
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.15 Most sig-
nificantly, the Introductory Section defines “disability” for the entire 
 
 7. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implica-
tions of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 413–14 
(1991) (quoting President George Bush during the ADA signing ceremony). 
 8. Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471 (1991). 
 9. See Zamudio v. Patla, 956 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
 10. See Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 11. See Coalition of Montanans Concerned with Disabilities v. Gallatin Airport Auth., 
957 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Mont. 1997). 
 12. See Howe v. Hull, 874 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
 13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12102 (1994). 
 14. One of the most interesting and often-quoted sentences of the ADA section reflects 
this concern with unintentional discrimination: 
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been 
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based 
on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from 
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals 
to participate in, and contribute to, society. 
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has indicated that it is impor-
tant to protect against discrimination based on thoughtlessness and ignorance, stating in School 
Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987), that “society’s accumulated myths and fears about 
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual 
impairment.” Although this was a Rehabilitation Act case, the general principles still apply. See 
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a); see also infra Part II.D. 
 15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). 
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statute as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of 
such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impair-
ment.”16 
B. Title I 
The next section of the ADA is Title I,17 which governs employ-
ment discrimination. The general rule against discrimination set 
forth in Title I is that “no covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, ad-
vancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment.”18 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) is responsible for issuing regulations to carry out Title I.19 
Title I of the ADA is quite aggressive in its approach, extending 
significant legal protections for the handicapped into the private sec-
 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). This definition was largely taken from section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act. All of the major terms in the definition of “disability” in the ADA are de-
fined in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations. “Physical or 
mental impairment” is defined as 
(i) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical 
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; muscu-
loskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; 
reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; 
[or] (ii) Any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic 
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 
28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (1999). “[M]ajor life activities” are defined as “functions such as caring 
for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, 
and working.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2). The regulations detail that the following factors should 
be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activ-
ity: “(i) the nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected duration of the 
impairment; (iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term 
impact of or resulting from the impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). However, as the Su-
preme Court has recently noted, these regulations are not binding. See Sutton v. United Air-
lines, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2145 (1999). 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (1994). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
 19. See id. § 12116. The promulgations of the EEOC range from interpretative guides 
to federal regulations which are accorded the full weight of any administrative agency. See 29 
C.F.R. § 1630 (regulations to implement the equal employment provisions of the ADA); see 
also United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Enforcement Guid-
ance: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (last modified Feb. 1, 
2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/psych.html>. 
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tor. Whereas traditional civil rights legislation, such as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, prohibits any consideration of personal charac-
teristics such as race or national origin, the ADA takes a more proac-
tive approach. It requires an employer to consider whether a reason-
able accommodation could remove a particular barrier to 
employment.20 An employer will violate the ADA if she does not take 
the additional steps of evaluating what possible accommodations 
would allow the applicant to perform the job, or of considering how 
the job can be performed in an alternative fashion.21 
C. Title III 
Title III of the ADA covers “Public Accommodations and Ser-
vices Operated by Private Entities.”22 The general prohibition against 
discrimination contained in Title III is that “no individual shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any per-
son who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public ac-
commodation.”23 Activities that are specifically prohibited are a de-
nial of participation or giving disabled participants an unequal or 
separate benefit.24 
Discrimination is broadly defined so as to include a failure to 
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures.25 
However, if the owner of a place of public accommodation can show 
that a modification or accommodation will “fundamentally alter” the 
nature of her good or service, then she is not required to modify or 
accommodate.26 
“Public accommodation” is not specifically defined in the ADA; 
rather, examples of public accommodations are given.27 Private clubs 
 
 20. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1999). 
 21. See Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act: The Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201, 
204 (1993). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 12181–12189 (1994). 
 23. See id. § 12182(a). 
 24. See id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). 
 25. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). These examples include “a motion picture house, thea-
ter, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment,” also “a park, zoo,  
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and religious organizations are statutorily exempted from the provi-
sions of Title III.28 The Attorney General is responsible under Title 
III for issuing regulations that can further the implementation of the 
ADA.29 
The majority of the body of law that has developed under the 
ADA has developed within Title I. The courts, however, have bor-
rowed the decisional principles behind Title I case law in deciding 
cases under different titles. For example, in McPherson v. Michigan 
High School Athletic Ass’n,30 a case involving Title II, the Sixth Cir-
cuit applied the principles developed under Title I case-law.31 Like-
wise, in Johnson v. Gambrinus Company/Spoetzl Brewery,32 the Fifth 
Circuit was guided by the more fully developed Title I case law in 
determining the burden of proof for a reasonable modification under 
Title III.33 
D. Relationship with Rehabilitation Act 
The ADA was not drawn on a blank canvas. Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act,34 enacted in 1979, prohibits federal agencies and 
employers that receive federal funds from discriminating against ap-
plicants or employees with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act pro-
tects “otherwise qualified individual[s] with a disability.”35 Under 
 
amusement park, or other place of recreation,” or “a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, 
golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.” Id. 
 28. See id. § 12187 (“The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to private clubs 
or establishments exempted from coverage under title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . or 
to religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations, including places of 
worship.”). 
 29. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187(b). The resulting regulations are found in the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101–36.108. 
 30. 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 31. See id. at 460 (“Not surprisingly, most of the law that has been made in ADA cases 
has arisen in the context of employment discrimination claims, but we have no doubt that the 
decisional principles of these cases may be applied to this case.”). 
 32. 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 33. See id. at 1058.  
The central issue for us to address in this case is the allocation of the burdens of 
proof in a ‘reasonable modifications case’ under Title III. Because no Fifth Circuit 
case sets forth these burdens in the context of Title III, we will look to the more 
fully developed case law under Title I of the ADA, which prohibits disability dis-
crimination in employment. 
Id. 
 34. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797(b) (1994). 
 35. Id. § 794. 
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the Rehabilitation Act a “qualified handicapped person” is defined 
by the relevant regulations as “[w]ith respect to employment, a 
handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can per-
form the essential functions of the job in question and . . . [w]ith re-
spect to services, a handicapped person who meets the essential eligi-
bility requirements for the receipt of such services.”36 The Supreme 
Court has held that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual “is 
one who is able to meet all of a program’s requirements in spite of 
his handicap.”37 
Many key components of the ADA are taken directly from sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Rehabilitation Act cases. A 
key rationale used to support the ADA was that it essentially ex-
tended an existing federal statute into the private sector.38 Perhaps 
most significantly, the ADA definition of disability comes directly 
from the definition of an “individual with a handicap” under the Re-
habilitation Act.39 As a result, both Rehabilitation Act and ADA cases 
use the same analysis in determining if a plaintiff is disabled.40 Addi-
tionally, the ADA provides that, except as otherwise stated, nothing 
in the Act shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than those 
applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the regu-
lations issued by federal agencies pursuant to that title.41 As a result 
of the legislature’s intent for the Rehabilitation Act to serve as an 
important guiding role in the ADA, courts have often applied Reha-
bilitation Act concepts and precedent in ADA cases.42 
 
 36. 28 C.F.R. § 41.32 (1990). 
 37. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979). 
 38. See Jones, supra note 8, at 475. 
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (stating that an individual with a handicap is “any person 
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such per-
son’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having 
such an impairment”). 
 40. See Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Congress in-
tended that the relevant case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act be generally applica-
ble to the term ‘disability’ as used in the ADA.”) (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(g) 
(1999)). 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994). 
 42. In Pottgen v. Missouri St. High School Activities Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994), 
the Plaintiff raised both § 504 and Title II ADA claims. After proceeding first through the  
§ 504 analysis, the court noted “Congress intended Title II to be consistent with section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act. This desire for consistency is evident from the ADA statutory scheme 
itself. Enforcement remedies, procedures and rights under Title II are the same as under sec-
tion 504.” Id. at 930; see also Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(“[B]ecause the standards under both acts are largely the same, cases construing one statute are 
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E. No Explicit Mention of Professional Sports 
The ADA contains no specific exemption for professional sports. 
During the floor debate on the ADA, no such exemption was even 
discussed. The only mention of professional sports during these de-
bates concerned the ADA’s possible effects on the drug test policies 
of the National Football League, the National Hockey League, the 
National Basketball Association, and Major League Baseball.43 In 
fact, apart from private clubs and religious entities, no particular in-
dustry is granted any type of special exemption from the ADA. 
III. THE TITLE I “UNDUE BURDEN” AND THE TITLE III 
“FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATIONS” REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS 
ANALYSES 
A. Two Necessary Precursors to the Reasonable Accommodations 
Analyses 
A professional athlete (or would-be professional athlete) request-
ing a rule modification from her professional league or association44 
needs to prove two things before a court will consider her request for 
a reasonable accommodation. First, the athlete needs to prove that 
she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Second, she needs to 
prove that her professional league or association is covered by the 
ADA. These threshold issues will be briefly discussed in turn. 
 
instructive in construing the other.”); McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 
F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997) (performing a similar Title II analysis and noting that “it is well-
established that the two statutes are quite similar in purpose and in scope.”); Burns v. Colum-
bus, 91 F.3d. 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[B]y statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
standards apply in Rehabilitation Act cases alleging employment discrimination.”); Monette v. 
Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he analysis of claims 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act roughly parallels those brought under the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973.”). 
 43. See H. R. Rep. No. 101-485 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303. The 
drafters of the ADA agreed that these policies were in compliance with the requirements of the 
ADA. 
 44. As used herein, “league” and “association” refer to the governing and rule making 
body of the particular sport; e.g., Major League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Football 
League (“NFL”), the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), and the National Hockey 
League (“NHL”). 
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1. Disability 
The first thing an athlete-plaintiff will need to prove is that she is 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA. To achieve this, the athlete 
is really no different from any other ADA plaintiff. Although athletes 
might be subject to more sprains, strains, and broken bones than the 
general population, the regulations and case law are clear that these 
are not ADA disabilities.45 Additionally, three recent Supreme Court 
decisions make it more difficult than it has been in the past for any 
plaintiff to establish an ADA disability.46 
2. League or association covered under Title I or Title III 
Before reaching the reasonable accommodations analysis, the 
second thing an athlete-plaintiff needs to prove is that her league or 
association is covered by the ADA. Otherwise, the athlete has no one 
to sue. There are two ways to successfully argue that a league or as-
sociation is covered under the ADA. The first is to show that the 
league or association is an “employer,” and is therefore covered by 
Title I. Although it is not yet clear whether a league or association 
would be an ADA-covered employer, it is quite possible that they 
could be.47 Although the ADA defines both employer and em-
 
 45. See Sanders v. Arnenson Prod., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
temporary injury with minimal residual side effects cannot be the basis for sustainable ADA 
claim). 
 46. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999), and Albert-
son’s, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999), both decided recently by the Supreme 
Court, hold that corrective and mitigating measures should be considered in determining 
whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity. Thus, impairments which 
can be corrected with artificial aides (eyeglasses, medications) or physiological adaptations, may 
not be disabling within the meaning of section 12102(2). These cases, combined with Murphy 
v. United Postal Service, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999), cast doubt on whether a 
plaintiff will be able to show that the life activity that their disability substantially limits is 
“working.” In Sutton, the Court noted that, while it was “[a]ssuming without deciding” that 
working could be the major life activity at issue, 
[t]o be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be 
precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of 
choice. If jobs utilizing an individual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her unique tal-
ents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs.  
___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. This has the potential to be especially harmful to profes-
sional athletes seeking to use “working” as their major life activity; their jobs are a blend of 
highly specialized skills, and they do not have a wide variety of jobs to choose from. 
 47. See Tanya R. Sharpe, Casey’s Case: Taking a Slice out of the PGA Tour’s No-Cart Pol-
icy, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 783 (1999) (discussing the possibility of the PGA being covered 
by Title I of the ADA). 
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ployee,48 the definitions do not offer much guidance. Consequently, 
courts have turned to the common law test.49 This has the potential 
for an expansive interpretation: in the civil rights context, courts have 
been willing to define the employment relationship more broadly 
than the common law definition would suggest.50 Title I is even 
more attractive to a potential plaintiff than Title III, because it pro-
vides for jury trials51 and punitive damages.52 
 
 48. The statutory definition of an employer is “a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person.” 42 U.S.C.  
§ 12111(5)(A). “Employee” is simply defined as “an individual employed by an employer.” Id. 
§ 12111(4). The regulations promulgated by the EEOC offer no direct guidance, stating that 
“in general, the terms employer . . . and employee [have] the same meaning that [they are] 
given under Title VII.” 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(e)–(f). 
 49. As Title VII and other federal statutes define “employer” and “employee” in terms 
that are as cryptic as the ADA, courts have generally used one of three modes of analysis to 
determine if an employment relationship exists. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (setting forth the common law test); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 
F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1983) (using the “economic realities” test); Wolcott v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 884 F.2d 245, 251 (6th Cir. 1989) (using the “combination” test). Despite minor 
differences between the three analyses, in all of them the employer’s right to control is deter-
minative. Every professional league and association has some measure of control over its ath-
letes. Although they do not sign the individual athlete’s paychecks, the NBA, NFL, NHL, and 
MLB all have the ultimate say in determining the rules of competition. The same holds true for 
the PGA and the USGA. The commissioners of all the major team sports have broad powers to 
act in the best interests of their sports. Although in professional boxing the promoters perhaps 
look more like employers than the governing bodies, whenever the WBA, WBC, or IBF sanc-
tions an event, their rules and regulations govern. See Tyson v. WBA, 1991 WL 41571 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). Although some may argue that any particular league or association is not an 
“employer” for Title I purposes, it is a fair prediction that courts may soon find that at least 
some of them are “employers.” A federal district court in Georgia has found that the PGA is an 
employer for the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Naismith v. PGA, 85 F.R.D. 
552 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (holding that a female golfer required to tee-off from the men’s tees at 
sectional PGA tournaments showcasing the talents of golfers seeking employment as golf club 
professionals, was employed by the PGA). The Naismith court reasoned that the PGA con-
trolled Naismith’s access to employment as a golf professional. This reasoning could be ex-
tended to the NFL, NBA, NHL, MLB, or professional boxing, all of whom control access to 
their sports. 
 50. In the civil rights context, significant weight is given to the controlling access and 
rules factor. See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983) (interpreting the term “em-
ployer” under Title VII, the court stated: “It is sufficiently broad to encompass any party who 
significantly affects access of any individual to employment opportunities, regardless of whether 
that party may technically be described as an ‘employer’ of an aggrieved individual as that term 
has generally been defined at common law”); see also Barone v. Hackett, 602 F. Supp. 481, 
483 (D.R.I. 1984) (“Title VII liability is not limited to the entity which issues pay checks to 
the employee.”). 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (1994). 
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An athlete-plaintiff might also attempt to show that her league is 
covered under Title III. To do this, she would need to demonstrate 
that the defendant league or association is an “owner or operator” of 
a place of public accommodation. The Martin court considered 
whether the PGA was covered under Title III of the ADA, and held 
that it was.53 In Olinger, the Seventh Circuit declined to directly an-
swer the question of whether the USGA was an owner or operator of 
a place of public accommodation.54 At least one nonprofessional 
sports association has been found to be the owner and operator of a 
place of public accommodation.55 Although it is not completely clear 
that courts will always view a professional sports league or association 
 
 52. See id. 
 53. Martin, 204 F.3d at 994. The PGA argued that the competitor’s area was not a 
public accommodation because the public had no right to enter it. See id. at 997. The Ninth 
Circuit, citing Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 759 (D. 
Or. 1997) (holding that the executive seats in the Rose Garden Arena were subject to the 
ADA, even though they were not open to the general public), rejected this “zone” theory. The 
court also cited a line of cases involving disabled student-athletes, and viewed the underlying 
premise of these cases as being that “Title III applies to the playing field, not just the stands.” 
Martin, 204 F.3d at 998. The court reasoned that the fact that the users of a facility are highly 
selected does not mean that the facility cannot be a public accommodation. The court analo-
gized to the case of highly elite private universities, which, although highly competitive to gain 
entry into, are still places of public accommodation to the students that are admitted to them. 
The court concluded that an intense winnowing process does not change the nature of the 
facility. At the district court level, the PGA also argued that they were a private club, and there-
fore not subject to the ADA. The court rejected this proposition, noting that the private club 
exemption is to be narrowly construed. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1323 (citing Nesmith v. 
YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968)). The district court evaluated the PGA along the 
seven factor test outlined in United States v. Landsdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. 
Pa. 1989), and held that the PGA was not a private club. The district court in Martin charac-
terized the PGA tour as  
an organization formed to promote and operate tournaments for the economic 
benefit of its members, a highly skilled group of professional golfers. As with all pro-
fessional sports organizations, the Tour is part of the entertainment industry, offer-
ing competitive athletic events to the public, which in turn generate sponsorship of 
the events, network fees, advertising revenue, and, ultimately, the tournament prize 
money awarded the competitors. The Tour, in short, is a commercial enterprise. 
Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. Almost without qualification, the same could be said of a pro-
fessional boxing association. With the exception of generating the tournament prize money 
awarded to the competitors, this analysis and definition could easily be applied to the NBA, 
MLB, NHL, or NFL. 
 54. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005. The Olinger court preferred to decide the case on 
the more “narrow” fundamental alterations ground. Id. 
 55. See Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D. Ariz. 1992) 
(holding that Little League Baseball falls within the ambit of Title III because they own, lease 
(or leased to), or operate a place of public accommodation). 
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as an owner or operator of a place of public accommodation,56 at a 
minimum the Martin case established that courts can and will hold 
that they are so covered under Title III. 
As indicated, the question of whether either Title I or Title III 
coverage exists is somewhat unsettled. This question is also an ex-
tremely important one: if the athlete-plaintiff cannot establish that 
the league or association is covered under Title I or Title III, there is 
no proper defendant, and the lawsuit will be dismissed. A complete 
and thorough discussion of this topic would require another article. 
However, this article proceeds from the assumption that the athlete-
plaintiff would be able to demonstrate that the league or association 
is covered under either Title I or Title III.57 
B. Should the Accommodation Be Made? Undue Burden and 
Fundamental Alteration 
Once a court finds that a plaintiff is disabled, and the defendant 
is covered under Title I or Title III, the court must determine 
 
 56. Certainly there are cases and arguments that suggest that a court would not. In 
Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1036 (6th Cir. 1995), the 
Sixth Circuit overruled the district court’s ruling that Title III covered the Michigan High 
School Athletic Association (“MHSAA”). Likewise, in McPherson, the Sixth Circuit again 
noted that “it is quite clear that the MHSAA is not a private entity operating a place of public 
accommodation.” McPherson, 119 F.3d at 463. However, both of these cases rested on the 
misconception that MHSAA was not a private entity when in fact it was public. Under the 
ADA, public accommodations are operated by private entities, not public entities. See Sandison, 
64 F.3d at 1036. Therefore, these cases are easily distinguished from that of a professional 
sports organization which is a private entity. In Stoutenborough v. NFL, Inc., 59 F.3d 580 (6th 
Cir. 1995), an association of individuals with hearing impairments alleged that the NFL’s 
blackout rule (prohibiting live local broadcasts of home football games that are not sold out) 
violated their rights under the ADA. The court held that “[i]t is all of the services which the 
public accommodation offers, not all services which the lessor of the public accommodation 
offers which fall within the scope of Title III.” Id. at 583. The court concluded that the NFL 
was disqualified from Title III. The Martin decision has been criticized for holding that the 
PGA is subject to Title III of the ADA. Critics have contended that the Martin court erred in 
holding that the PGA was not exempt from the ADA as a private club or establishment, and 
erred in not accepting the PGA’s “zone of applicability” argument. See Matthew Kensky, Casey 
Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.: Introducing Handicaps to Professional Golf by Widening the Scope of 
the ADA, 9 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 151, 175–87 (1998). 
 57. If this is not the case, then a court will never get to the reasonable accommodations 
analysis. For example, if in the Martin case the Supreme Court decides that the PGA is not 
covered under Title III as an operator of a public accommodation, then the Court will never 
reach the issue of whether use of a golf cart is a reasonable accommodation and would funda-
mentally change the PGA Tour. Some commentators would urge the Court to take this route. 
See Kensky, supra note 56, at 175–87. 
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whether the requested accommodation can and should be made. 
This question is at the heart of what this article will attempt to dis-
cuss. Under Title I, this is primarily accomplished with the “undue 
burden” analysis. Under Title III, a court will use the “fundamental 
alterations” analysis. This section will discuss the statutory frame-
works and applicable case law for each of these analyses. 
1. The Title I Analysis—Undue Burden 
Title I of the ADA provides that no covered entity shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the dis-
ability of such an individual.58 Accordingly, the relevant concepts are 
“discriminate,” “qualified individual,” “disability,” and “because of 
the disability.” 
An employer discriminates against an applicant or employee 
when she refuses to make a reasonable accommodation to a known 
limitation.59 As discussed above, “disability” is defined under the 
ADA as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of 
such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impair-
ment.”60 Generally, the “because of the disability” phrase has not 
been interpreted to require intentional discrimination,61 and a profes-
sional athlete would not need to prove that the league is excluding 
her because it does not want disabled athletes participating. 
A “qualified individual with a disability” is defined under Title I 
as “an individual with a disability, who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employ-
 
 58. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
 59. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 60. Id. § 12102(2). 
 61. For example, racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause generally re-
quires proof of discriminatory purpose. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). How-
ever, disability jurisprudence has followed a different path. In Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 
287 (1984), the Supreme Court rejected the contention that section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act only reached purposeful discrimination against the handicapped. This principle has been 
applied to the ADA. See Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 181 F.3d 840, 846–
47 (7th Cir. 1999). However, it is interesting to note, that there is contradictory case law in 
the amateur athletic context. Some courts have used the “because of disability” language to 
allow “neutral” rules which have a disparate impact on the disabled to defeat ADA challenges. 
See Sandison 64 F.3d at 1036 (holding that a high school athletic association’s rule that de-
clared 19 year-old students ineligible to compete was “neutral” rule; therefore student who 
had been held back in school due to a learning disability, and was thus 19 in his senior year, 
was not being discriminated against because of his disability, but rather because of his age). 
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ment position that such individual holds or desires.”62 The plaintiff 
bears the burden of showing that with the reasonable accommoda-
tion, she can perform the essential functions of the job. “Essential 
functions” are the fundamental job duties of a position that an indi-
vidual with a disability is actually required to perform.63 In determin-
ing what job functions are essential, a court is required by the ADA 
to consider the employer’s judgment but not defer to it completely. 
Written job descriptions are probative evidence.64 A job function may 
also be essential if there are a limited number of employees among 
whom performance of this job can be distributed.65 An individual 
who is completely disabled, and who cannot perform the essential 
functions of a job even with a reasonable accommodation, is not 
“qualified,” and receives no ADA protection.66 
At this stage of the analysis, the plaintiff necessarily must present 
her individualized situation, and show what she can and cannot do. 
Disabled individuals must be individually assessed for each job for 
which they apply.67 This is consistent with the ADA regulations: 
[T]he determination of whether an individual is qualified for a par-
ticular position must necessarily be made on a case-by-case ba-
sis. . . . [A]n accommodation must be tailored to match the needs 
of the disabled individual with the needs of the job’s essential func-
tions. . . . This case-by-case approach is essential. . . . [N]either the 
ADA nor this part can supply the ‘correct’ answer in advance for 
each employment decision.68 
The plaintiff also carries the burden of showing that her re-
quested accommodation is reasonable. In Riel v. Electronic Data Sys-
tems Corporation,69 this burden was interpreted as a showing that the 
 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
 63. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i) (1999). 
 64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
 65. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii); see also Holbrook v. Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 
1526 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 66. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“A totally disabled person who cannot ‘perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position’ with or without reasonable accommodations thus cannot be a ‘qualified indi-
vidual’ entitled to sue under Title I of the Act.” (citing Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 
1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996))). 
 67. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; see also Bombrys v. Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210, 1216 
(N.D. Ohio 1993). 
 68. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630. 
 69. 99 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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requested accommodation is “a method of accommodation that is 
reasonable in the run of cases.”70 The facts in Riel provide a good 
demonstration of how this works. The employee’s disability prohib-
ited her from reaching certain milestone deadlines, but she was still 
able to reach final deadlines. She requested that her employer trans-
fer her to another division in the company that did not use milestone 
deadlines. She demonstrated that this accommodation was reason-
able as a general manner by presenting evidence that the employer 
often shifted employees back and forth between the two divisions.71 
The employer can challenge the reasonableness of the accommoda-
tion only by evidence showing that the accommodation generally 
would not be reasonable.72 
The ADA does not specifically define “reasonable accommoda-
tion.” Rather, it gives examples. Within the statute, the ADA pro-
vides: 
‘[R]easonable accommodation’ may include: (A) making existing 
facilities used by employees readily accessible to and useable by in-
dividuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or 
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acqui-
sition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjust-
ments or modifications of examinations, training materials or poli-
cies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other 
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.73 
The EEOC has further defined reasonable accommodation as 
“any change in the work environment or in the way things are cus-
tomarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy 
equal employment opportunities,”74 and divides accommodations 
into three categories.75 
 
 
 70. Id. at 683 (citations omitted). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). 
 74. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630. 
 75. These categories are: 
(1) accommodations . . . required to ensure equal opportunity in the application 
process; (2) [those that] enable the employer’s employees with disabilities to per-
form the essential functions of the position held or desired; and (3) those that en-
able the employer’s employees with disabilities to enjoy equal benefits and privileges 
of employment as are enjoyed by employees without disabilities. 
Id. 
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Once a plaintiff has shown that she is a “qualified individual,” 
and that the requested accommodation is “reasonable,” the em-
ployer must make the accommodation unless it can be shown that 
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.76 Undue 
hardship is an affirmative defense, and courts have held that the bur-
den is on the employer to prove it.77 The ADA defines undue hard-
ship as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense,”78 and 
continues: 
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an un-
due hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include: 
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this 
chapter; (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities 
involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the 
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses 
and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation 
upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial re-
sources of the covered entity . . . with respect to the number of its 
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) 
the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including 
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such 
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative or fiscal relation-
ship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.79 
The federal regulations promulgated by the EEOC under this 
Title add a fifth factor to be considered: “[T]he impact of the ac-
commodation upon the operation of the facility, including the im-
pact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and 
the impact on the facility’s ability to conduct business.”80 
Therefore, the undue hardship defense does not just concern fi-
nancial factors. It is also the employer’s way to argue that the re-
quested accommodation will unacceptably modify their business. For 
example, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,81 the Supreme 
Court held that a college did not have to make significant curricular 
 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Discrimination includes “not making reasonable ac-
commodations . . . unless [the defendant] can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship.”). 
 77. See Riel, 99 F.3d at 683. 
 78. 42 U.S.C § 12111(10)(A). 
 79. Id. § 12111(10)(b). 
 80. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (1999). 
 81. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). 
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changes to accommodate a deaf nursing student applicant.82 Funda-
mental alterations, such as eliminating clinical classes and having 
constant, close interaction with a nursing instructor were more than 
“reasonable” modifications required under the law.83 Although the 
specific holding in Southeastern fits more neatly into a Title II or Ti-
tle III “fundamental alteration” analysis, under Title I these types of 
concerns must take place within the “undue burden” framework.84 If 
the defendant cannot meet its burden of showing that the accom-
modation unduly burdens their business, it must make the requested 
accommodation.85 
2. The Title III Analysis—Fundamental Alteration 
The Title III general prohibition against discrimination is that 
“no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability 
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accom-
modation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates 
a place of public accommodation.”86 Discrimination is broadly de-
 
 82. See id. at 410. 
 83. Id. Although Southeastern was a Rehabilitation Act case, courts have applied the 
general principle to ADA cases. See Olinger, 205 F.3d 1001, 1005 (“In light of Davis, courts 
have repeatedly held that the ADA does not require entities to change their basic nature, char-
acter, or purpose insofar as that purpose is rational, rather than a pretext for discrimination.”); 
see also Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n., 181 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1999); Bombrys v. 
Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210, 1216 (N.D. Ohio 1993). 
 84. See Earl v. Mervyn’s, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Bombrys, 849 F. 
Supp. at 1216. 
 85. Besides proving an undue burden, the employer can also avoid making an accom-
modation by pleading and proving the “safety defense.” If an employer can demonstrate that a 
requested accommodation will cause a direct threat to others in the workplace, then the re-
quested accommodation is not reasonable. “Direct threat” is defined in the ADA as “a signifi-
cant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommoda-
tion.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994). The “direct threat” inquiry must be done according to 
an individualized analysis. The EEOC regulations add harm to the individual as well as to oth-
ers.  They continue to explain that the determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ 
shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely per-
form the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical 
judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available ob-
jective evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors 
to be considered include: “(1)[t]he duration of the risk; (2)[t]he nature and severity of the 
potential harm; (3)[t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence 
of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 
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fined and includes a failure to make reasonable modifications in poli-
cies, practices, or procedures.87 Although Title III reads, “discrimi-
nated against on the basis of disability,” and Title I reads, “because 
of disability,” Title III has been interpreted similarly to Title I in this 
regard. In other words, no showing of impermissible intent has been 
required.88 
What exactly constitutes discrimination under Title III? The 
most applicable statutory provision states that discrimination is a 
“failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations 
to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that 
making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of 
such goods, services . . . or accommodations.”89 If the owner or op-
erator of a place of public accommodation can show that a modifica-
tion or accommodation will “fundamentally alter” the nature of her 
good or service, then she is not required to modify or accommo-
date.90 
In applying this definition, courts have adopted an approach that 
is virtually identical to that used in analysis of Title I actions. This 
approach was most thoroughly explained in a Title III context in 
Johnson v. Gambrinus Company/Spoetzel Brewery.91 As with Title I, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proving that a modification was re-
quested, and that the requested accommodation was reasonable.92 
“The plaintiff meets this burden by introducing evidence that the re-
quested modification is reasonable in the general sense, that is rea-
sonable in the run of cases.”93 While the defendant may introduce 
evidence indicating that the plaintiff’s requested accommodation is 
not reasonable in the run of cases, the plaintiff bears the ultimate 
burden of proof on the issue.94 
 
 87. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). 
 88. Rather, discrimination can be proven by showing that the defendant failed to 
accommodate. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II); see also Washington v. Indiana High 
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 181 F.3d 840, 848 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 89. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 90. Id. 
 91. 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1997). The Johnson court explained that it was borrowed 
the Title I approach from Riel.  See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 92. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. 
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If the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must make the 
requested modification unless the defendant pleads, and meets her 
burden of proving, that the requested modification would “funda-
mentally alter” the nature of the public accommodation.95 This is 
similar to the “undue burden” affirmative defense that an employer 
uses in Title I. “While Title I provides an undue hardship defense 
and Title III provides a fundamental alteration defense, fundamental 
alteration is merely a particular type of undue hardship.”96 
Similarly to the Title I undue burden defense, an owner or op-
erator of a public accommodation who wants to demonstrate that a 
requested accommodation would be a fundamental alteration will 
need to use proof focusing on specific circumstances.97 Courts have 
almost uniformly found that the ADA requires a fact-specific, case-
by-case determination of whether a particular accommodation is rea-
sonable.98 This means that a defendant must offer, and a court will 
evaluate, the purposes of the rule or regulation at issue and deter-
mine the ramifications of an exception in light of the plaintiff’s indi-
vidualized circumstances. If the defendant cannot meet the burden 
of showing a fundamental alteration, the accommodation must be 
made.99 
 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. See also Dahlberg v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 92 F. Supp.2d 1091, 1105 (D. 
Colo. 2000) (“Thus, there appears to be little, if any, substantive difference between the ‘rea-
sonable accommodation’ which title I requires and the ‘reasonable modification’ which title III 
mandates.”); Sharpe, supra note 47, at 799 (“The closest thing to Title I’s undue hardship 
defense is the previously discussed fundamental alteration defense.”). 
 97. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1058. 
 98. See Staron v. McDonalds, Corp., 51 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1995); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 
81 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he determination of what constitutes a reasonable 
modification is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case inquiry.”). 
 99. Similarly to Title I, the owner or operator of the public accommodation can also use 
the “safety defense.” The standards and analysis for this claim are functionally similar to the 
“direct threat” defense available to an employer under Title I. Under Title III, “direct threat” 
is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a 
modification of policies, practices, or procedures.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b) (1999). Under both 
Titles, the analysis must be individualized. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (Title I); 28 C.F.R. § 
36.208(c) (Title III). Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 
1992), is a good example of this. Little League Baseball had a policy that wheelchairs were not 
allowed on the field, as they posed a direct threat of a collision with players. A first-base coach 
who wanted to coach from the first-base box brought a Title III ADA suit. The court held that 
the defendant’s rationale of the danger of direct harm cannot be based on generalizations or 
stereotypes about the effects of a particular disability; rather, it must be based on an individual-
ized assessment. The court held that because Little League Baseball had not conducted such an 
individualized inquiry, it had violated the ADA. 
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When applying the ADA to amateur athletics, some courts have 
held that an individualized analysis into the necessity of a given rule 
may not be appropriate. Put another way, a given rule may be essen-
tial, even though given a particular plaintiff’s individualized situation, 
their participation would not violate the rule’s purpose. In Sandison 
v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n,100 a learning-disabled student 
who had been held back in school, and thus was over eighteen in his 
senior season, sued his athletic association under Title III of the 
ADA. The association offered, and the court accepted, that the pur-
pose of the association’s rule (that no one could play high school 
athletics after age nineteen) was to safeguard against injury and to 
protect against competitive advantage.101 However, these particular 
plaintiffs demonstrated that neither of these concerns would be im-
plicated in their specific case.102 The court held it would be unrea-
sonable to force an athletic association to do a case-by-case inquiry 
and determination.103 
Likewise, in McPherson,104 the Sixth Circuit found that making a 
determination on a case-by-case basis as to whether or not to waive 
an eight semester high school athletic eligibility rule would require 
too much of an administrative and financial burden.105 Therefore, the 
court would not entertain McPherson’s argument that as applied to 
him, one individual waiver was not unreasonable and would not fun-
damentally change the nature of the entity.106 In Pottgen v. Missouri 
State High School Activities Ass’n,107 the Eighth Circuit similarly held 
that the defendant did not have to prove that given the individual-
ized circumstances of this particular plaintiff, that an exception to a 
rule would fundamentally alter the nature of the public accommoda-
 
 100. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 101. See id. at 1029. 
 102. See id. at 1035 (explaining they were not more physically mature than their class-
mates, they were “average” athletes, and because their chosen sport was track, there was no 
danger of injury). 
 103. See id. (“It is plainly an undue burden to require high school coaches and hired phy-
sicians to determine whether these factors render a student’s age an unfair competitive advan-
tage . . . . It is unreasonable to call upon coaches and physicians to make these near-impossible 
determinations.”). 
 104. 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 105. See id. at 461. 
 106. See id. at 463. 
 107. 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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tion.108 Judge Arnold dissented, reasoning that the ADA required an 
individualized analysis in every case.109 
Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n110 is a recent 
case involving amateur athletics that highlights this issue. Like 
McPherson, Washington involved a student with a learning disability 
who was requesting a waiver of an eight-semester eligibility rule. The 
Seventh Circuit had to choose whether a waiver of the rule in this 
particular case was so at odds with the purposes behind the rule that 
it would be a fundamental or unreasonable change, or whether a 
waiver was not required if the rule itself was generally an essential or 
necessary eligibility requirement. The Washington court chose the 
former analysis, siding with Judge Arnold’s Pottgen dissent.111 
In sum, assuming that the athlete-plaintiff can demonstrate dis-
ability, and the court views the league or association as an employer 
or owner/operator of a public accommodation, the court will then 
decide whether the requested accommodation is reasonable. Al-
though the Title I and Title III tests for this have different names, 
they are quite similar, and both focus on the extent to which the 
proposed modification will affect the entity at issue. 
IV. THE MARTIN AND OLINGER DECISIONS 
The Martin and Olinger decisions are the only two cases to date 
that apply the ADA to professional sports. Both were Title III cases. 
This section will attempt to highlight the different factual findings 
and legal conclusions that led to these divergent holdings and dem-
onstrate why neither decision completely works as a model for future 
cases of this type. 
 
 108. See id. at 930. 
 109. Chief Judge Arnold criticized the majority for applying the MHSAA rule as essen-
tial, without determining whether it was so in Pottgen’s individual case: 
[T]he age requirement could be modified for this individual player without doing 
violence to the admittedly salutary purposes underlying the age rule. But instead of 
looking at the rule’s operation in the individual case of Ed Pottgen, both the Activi-
ties Association and this Court simply recite the rule’s general justifications . . . and 
mechanically apply it across the board. But if a rule can be modified without doing 
violence to its essential purposes . . . . I do not believe that it can be “essential” to 
the nature of the program or activity to refuse to modify the rule. 
Id. at 932–33 (Arnold, J., dissenting). 
 110. 181 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 111. See id. at 850. 
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A. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. 
1. Background 
Casey Martin, a star amateur golfer at Stanford, attempted to 
join golf’s professional ranks in 1997. Martin went to PGA qualify-
ing school, where the top finishers qualify for the PGA Tour, and the 
next-best finishers qualify for the Nike Tour.112 Qualifying school is 
conducted in three stages, and players are eliminated in each stage. 
In the first two stages, players are allowed to use carts.113 Martin 
played well enough to advance to the third round of the 1997 quali-
fying school. In the third stage of qualifying school (as well as the ac-
tual PGA and Nike Tour events), the players are required to walk the 
course.114 Martin has Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, a painful 
congenital vascular malformation that affects his right leg. This con-
dition prevents him from being able to walk a full golf course.115 He 
requested permission from the PGA to use a golf cart. The PGA re-
fused Martin’s request. 
2. The district court 
Martin sued the PGA under the ADA in the United States Dis-
trict Court in Oregon. He initially received a preliminary injunction 
that allowed him to use a golf cart in the third round of qualifying 
 
 112. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 996. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. The district court in Martin described Casey Martin’s condition as follows: 
     The right leg appears to be about half the size of the plaintiff’s left leg. When 
plaintiff removes his double set of support stockings and stands upright, the leg im-
mediately discolors and swells in size because the circulatory condition with which 
he is afflicted prevents the blood from flowing through his veins back to the heart. 
Instead, gravity, combined with “incompetent” valves which fail to close properly, 
pulls the blood back down his leg. The leg becomes engorged in blood because the 
arteries pump blood to his leg but the veins fail to circulate blood back to the heart. 
To relieve this situation, plaintiff must lie down and elevate his leg. 
     A double set of support or compression stockings provides plaintiff with enough 
venous pressure to allow him to remain upright for periods of time. As he has gotten 
older (he is now 25 years of age), his leg has steadily worsened because of his 
disability. Whereas he used to be able to walk a golf course (albeit with difficulty), 
he can no longer do so. As noted, he is at substantial risk of serious physical harm by 
the mere act of walking. 
Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1243–44. 
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school.116 Martin then played well enough to secure a spot on the 
Nike Tour. The district court granted Martin a partial summary 
judgment, holding that the PGA was covered under Title III of the 
ADA as the operator of a place of public accommodation.117 After a 
six-day bench trial, the district court held that modifying the walking 
rule for Casey Martin did not fundamentally alter the nature of the 
PGA’s golf tournaments. 
The district court started its analysis by noting that Martin met 
his initial burden of demonstrating that his requested accommoda-
tion was reasonable in the general sense.118 The burden was then 
placed on the PGA to demonstrate the requested accommodation 
was not reasonable. The district court rejected the PGA’s contention 
that any modification of a substantive rule of competition would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA Tour, noting: “[T]he 
ADA does not distinguish between sports organizations and other 
entities when it comes to applying the ADA to a specific situa-
tion. . . . [T]he disabled have just as much interest in being free from 
discrimination in the athletic world as they do in other aspects of 
everyday life.”119 In examining the purpose of the PGA’s walking 
rule, the district court accepted the PGA’s contention that its pur-
pose was to inject the element of fatigue into the skill of shot mak-
ing. However, the court found that fatigue caused by walking a golf 
course in normal circumstances could not be considered signifi-
cant.120 
The district court then went on to state that its duty was not to 
determine if a cart would give a normal golfer an advantage by ren-
dering him less fatigued, but rather whether it would give Casey 
Martin an advantage. In weighing Casey Martin’s individualized cir-
cumstances against the purpose of the rule, the court reasoned: “The 
fatigue plaintiff endures just from coping with his disability is unde-
niably greater than the fatigue injected into tournament play on the 
 
 116. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 996. 
 117. See generally Martin, 984 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998). 
 118. See id. at 1248. 
 119. Id. at 1246. 
 120. See id. at 1250. The court relied on testimony from Dr. Gary Klug, who testified 
that approximately 500 calories are expended walking a golf course, which nutritionally was 
less than a Big Mac. The court also viewed as telling that even when PGA golfers do have the 
option of riding carts, they choose to walk. 
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able-bodied by the requirement that they walk from shot to shot.”121 
The district court concluded that Casey Martin received no competi-
tive advantage from riding a cart, and therefore accommodating him 
in this fashion would not fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA 
tour events. 
3. The Ninth Circuit 
The PGA appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge William Canby, affirmed.122 As 
an initial matter, the court accepted the district court’s conclusion 
that the PGA is subject to Title III of the ADA as an operator of a 
place of public accommodation.123 The court then turned to the 
question of whether allowing Casey Martin to use a golf cart would 
fundamentally alter the PGA and Nike Tour competitions. The court 
agreed with the district court’s factual findings that (1) the purpose 
of the walking rule was to inject an element of fatigue into the shot-
making process; (2) the fatigue factor injected into golf by walking 
the course cannot be deemed significant under normal circum-
stances; and (3) even with a cart, Martin easily endured greater fa-
tigue than his able-bodied, walking competitors.124 Accepting these 
findings paved the way for the court’s next step of affirming the dis-
trict court’s holding that permitting Casey Martin to use a golf cart 
in the PGA and Nike tournaments would not fundamentally alter the 
nature of those competitions. The court reasoned that the central 
competition in shot making would be unaffected by Martin’s ac-
commodation.125 
Already having made its holding, the court went on, arguably in 
dicta, to address the PGA’s other arguments. First, the PGA argued 
that while some rules, such as dress codes or uniform requirements, 
may be subject to exception to accommodate the disabled, a substan-
tive rule of competition cannot. According to the PGA, once a rule is 
determined to affect the competition, the rule cannot be modified. 
As such, Martin’s case should have ended as soon as the district court  
 
 
 121. Id. at 1251. 
 122. See generally Martin, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 123. See id. at 999. 
 124. See id. at 1000. 
 125. See id. 
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concluded that the purpose of the PGA’s walking-only rule was to 
inject fatigue into the competition.126 
In evaluating this argument, the court started with the language 
of section 12182(b)(A)(ii) of the ADA, which states that accommo-
dations must be made unless they “fundamentally alter” the nature 
of the public accommodation. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 
PGA’s position reads “fundamentally” out of the statute,127 and 
would make all alterations of the competition fundamental. The 
court determined that the statute mandates an inquiry into whether a 
particular exception to a rule would fundamentally alter the nature of 
the good or service. “We cannot tell whether a golf cart for Martin 
fundamentally alters the competition without first investigating 
whether walking is fundamental to the competition.”128 
The court reasoned that the determination of whether a particu-
lar rule is “fundamental” to the competition is an intensely fact-
based inquiry. This provided the basis for a rejection of the PGA’s 
position that allowing Martin to use a golf cart would open the door 
for giving disabled swimmers a head start, or moving the 3-point line 
in for growth-impaired basketball players. The court reasoned: “We 
have little doubt that fact-based inquiries into the effects of such ac-
commodation would result in rulings that those accommodations 
fundamentally altered the competitions.”129 
The PGA also contended that it was improper for a court to con-
sider whether Martin’s condition was such that riding would not give 
him unfair advantage over competitors who walked. The PGA ar-
gued it would be far too burdensome for the PGA to determine 
whether disabled individuals using carts would have an advantage 
over non-disabled walking competitors. The PGA relied on the San-
dison line of amateur-athletics cases that held it was an undue burden 
for an athletic association to do an individualized analysis to deter-
mine whether a given plaintiff would receive a competitive advantage 
if an eligibility rule were waived for him.130 The court first distin-
 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. at 1000–01 (“The difficulty with this position is that it reads the word ‘fun-
damentally’ out of the statutory language, which requires reasonable accommodation unless 
PGA can demonstrate that the accommodation would ‘fundamentally alter the nature’ of its 
competition.”). 
 128. Id. at 1001. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 
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guished these cases by noting that the rules at issue in all of them 
were determined to be fundamental to the competition. In contrast, 
the walking rule was not fundamental, because the district court 
found that the fatigue factor introduced by walking was not signifi-
cant. 
The court went on to note that an individualized determination 
might even be appropriate if a court found that a particular rule was 
fundamental to the sport. It noted Judge Arnold’s dissent in Pottgen 
that the inquiry must focus on the individual exception and that, in 
light of the plaintiff’s individual characteristics as found by the dis-
trict court, “the age requirement could be modified for this individ-
ual player without doing violence to the admittedly salutary purposes 
underlying the age rule.”131 The court concluded that the proper de-
termination for the PGA to make was whether providing Casey Mar-
tin with a golf cart gave him an unfair advantage over other golfers. 
The Ninth Circuit clearly believed it did not. 
4. The Supreme Court 
After the Ninth Circuit decision, the PGA applied for certiorari 
to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted 
certiorari, and will consider the case in the 2000-2001 term. 
B. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n 
1. Background 
Ford Olinger first became a professional golfer in 1988 when he 
received his certification from the PGA. Olinger suffers from bilateral 
avascular necrosis, which significantly impairs his ability to walk. 
Olinger had surgery on his left hip in 1997 and has delayed similar 
surgery on his right hip due to pain. By 1998, Olinger’s condition 
was severe enough that it was nearly impossible for him to walk an 
eighteen-hole golf course. In 1998, Olinger wanted to compete in 
the local qualifying round for the U.S. Open, one of thirteen na-
tional championships the USGA conducts each year. Olinger’s status 
as a professional golfer meant that he was eligible to compete in the 
 
1997); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995); Pottgen 
v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 131. Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 932 (Arnold, J., dissenting). 
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local qualifying round for the U.S. Open, which is an eighteen-hole 
round held at ninety sites across the nation. From that round, 750 
out of 6881 competitors advance to the sectional qualifying, which 
consists of thirty-six holes in a single day and is conducted in twelve 
sites across the nation.132 
In 1998, Olinger received a temporary restraining order that en-
abled him to use a cart and compete in the local qualifying round of 
the U.S. Open. He did not play well enough to advance to the sec-
ond round. Olinger wanted to compete again in the local qualifying 
round for the 1999 U.S. Open. The USGA denied Olinger’s request 
to use a golf cart, and Olinger sued the USGA in the United States 
District Court in the Northern District of Indiana.133 
2. The district court 
As an initial matter, the district court held that the USGA was 
covered under Title III of the ADA. The district court then turned 
to the question of whether allowing Olinger to ride a cart would 
fundamentally alter the U.S. Open. First, the district court found 
that Olinger had met his burden of proving his requested accommo-
dation was reasonable in a general sense. The district court then 
evaluated the purpose behind the walking rule. The district court ac-
cepted the USGA’s contention that the purpose of the walking rule 
was to serve as a test of stamina. Unlike the court in Martin, the 
Olinger court found that the use of a cart can provide a competitive 
advantage over a golfer who walks.134 The district court agreed that 
the complete question was not whether a cart would give able-
bodied golfers an advantage over other able-bodied golfers, for 
Olinger was indisputably not an able-bodied golfer.135 However, the 
district court never addressed the issue of whether a cart would give 
Olinger an advantage over able-bodied golfers, although it suggested 
it would not: “Ford Olinger must ride a golf cart to play, and even  
 
 
 
 132. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1001–03. 
 133. See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 933 (N.D. Ind. 1999). 
 134. In reaching this conclusion, the court credited the testimony of Dr. James Rippe, an 
expert in the physiology of walking. See id. at 933. 
 135. Id. at 935. (“The court agrees with Mr. Olinger that a comparison between average 
able-bodied golfers is not the issue before the court: Mr. Olinger is not an average, able-
bodied golfer.”) 
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with a cart he is likely to be more fatigued at the day’s end than a 
healthy Tiger Woods or a healthy David Duvall.”136 
Rather, the district court held that it could not force the USGA 
to make that particular determination without fundamentally altering 
the nature of the U.S. Open. If Olinger were allowed to ride, the 
USGA would have to determine if the next applicant for a golf cart 
had an advantage over Ford Olinger. The district court reasoned that 
in addition to making an individualized decision based on Olinger’s 
case, it had to evaluate the requested accommodation’s impact on 
the U.S. Open. It noted that the U.S. Open has never used rules or 
discretionary decisions for the purpose of giving one competitor a 
systematic advantage over another. To put the USGA in a position 
where it had to do so would be to fundamentally alter the nature of 
the U.S. Open competition.137 
3. The Seventh Circuit 
Olinger appealed the decision of the district court to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by 
Judge Evans, affirmed.138 The court began its opinion with an exten-
sive explanation of the U.S. Open.139 The court continued this dis-
cussion with a list of past winners of the U.S. Open, including ten 
golfers and the years they won the U.S. Open.140 Apparently to 
demonstrate the importance of tradition in the U.S. Open, and the 
extent to which golf professionals treat the U.S. Open with respect, 
 
 136. Id. at 937. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1001. 
 139. See id. at 1002. The court noted that the U.S. Open had been conducted yearly 
since 1895, with the exception of the war years 1917–1918 and 1942–1945. The court con-
tinued by explaining that this year the U.S. Open will be played at the “historic” Pebble Beach 
course in California, and “[the U.S. Open’s] venues are true meccas of tournament golf, places 
like Winged Foot (Mamaroneck, New York); Medinah (Medinah, Illinois); Shinnecock Hills 
(Southampton, New York); Merion (Ardmore, Pennsylvania); and Congressional (Bethesda, 
Maryland).” Id. at 1002 n.1. 
 140. “Past winners of the U.S. Open include legends in the game: Bobby Jones (1923, 
1926, 1929, and 1930); Gene Sarazen (1922, 1932); Byron Nelson (1939); Ben Hogan 
(1948, 1950, 1951, and 1953); Arnold Palmer (1960); Jack Nicklaus (1962, 1967, 1972, and 
1980); Gary Player (1965); Hale Irwin (1974, 1979, and 1990); Tom Watson (1982); and 
Lee Trevino (1968, 1971).” Id. at 1002. The court continued, in a footnote, to add the names 
of eight more golfers. Id. at 1002 n.2 The court also recounted in detail the story of Willie 
Anderson, a Scotsman who immigrated to the United States just before the turn of the century 
and was the first four-time U.S. Open winner. Id. at 1002 n.3. 
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the court recounted the story of Payne Stewart’s father, who “‘al-
ways insisted’ he use the formal ‘William Payne Stewart’ on his U.S. 
Open application because, quoting Payne, ‘Dad always said this is 
the United States Open, your national championship, you write 
down your full name.”141 
The court addressed the argument that the USGA would be cov-
ered under Title III of the ADA, but declined to decide the issue, 
stating: 
[W]e can resolve this appeal, as did the district court, on a more 
narrow ground. Even assuming that the competitive part of the 
golf course on which the U.S. Open is played is a place of public 
accommodation covered by the ADA, Mr. Olinger cannot prevail 
because we believe his use of a cart during the tournament would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition. 142 
The court stated that Olinger’s contentions on appeal were: (1) 
the USGA did not present any proof (responsive to his personalized 
circumstances) that in fact allowing him to use a golf cart would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the event; and (2) the district 
court’s conclusion that allowing him to ride a cart would impose im-
possible administrative burdens was unsupported by the record. The 
court noted the district court’s factual finding that removing the 
walking rule from competition would “remove stamina (at least, a 
particular type of stamina) from the set of qualities designed to be 
tested in this competition.”143 The court held that these findings 
were amply supported by the record. In addressing the facts in the 
record that supported this finding, the court referenced professional 
golfer Ken Venturi’s testimony (a professional golfer, and Olinger’s 
witness), Dennis Hepler’s testimony, and Dr. Holland’s testimony.144 
The written opinion indicates that the court was especially taken 
with Ken Venturi’s testimony. After discussing Venturi’s impressive 
career in golf, the court spent a paragraph recounting the story of 
 
 141. Id. The court continued to inform the reader, in a footnote, that “Stewart won the 
U.S. Open in 1991 . . . and again last year in a memorable finish at Pinehurst in North Caro-
lina. He will not, of course, defend his championship this June as he died, tragically, in a mys-
terious plane crash last fall in South Dakota.” Id. at n.1. 
 142. Id. at 1005. 
 143. Id. at 1006 (quoting Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 937). 
 144. “Dr. Theodore Holland . . . testified that physical endurance and stamina are impor-
tant criteria in determining the national golf champion. As he put it, ‘there is a lot more to 
getting . . . around those 72 holes than just hitting the shots.’” Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1006. 
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Venturi’s performance in the 1964 U.S. Open, where battling dehy-
dration, and on the verge of collapse, Venturi managed to win the 
Open. The court spent the next paragraph citing Venturi’s testimony 
about the “amazing” story of Ben Hogan, who in 1949 was injured 
when his car collided with a Greyhound bus, yet returned the next 
year to walk and win the U.S. Open. Venturi opined that even if he 
would have had the option, Hogan would not have thought about 
using a cart.145 The court stated it was using Venturi’s testimony for 
one reason: “[I]t emphasizes the importance and tradition of walk-
ing in championship-level tournament golf competition.”146 
Next, the court addressed the district court’s second rationale for 
ruling in favor of the USGA, that the administrative burdens of 
evaluating requests to waive the walking rule and permit the use of a 
golf cart were to great. Without any analysis, the court agreed with 
the district court that evaluating these individual requests was 
unnecessary. 
In the final paragraph of its opinion, the court conceded that it 
was not specifically addressing whether the USGA should give seri-
ously disabled, but otherwise well-qualified, golfers a chance to 
compete. The court concluded that: 
[T]he decision on whether the rules of the game should be ad-
justed to accommodate him is best left to those who hold the fu-
ture of golf in trust. Because the law does not force the USGA to 
make the accommodation Olinger seeks, the judgment of the dis-
trict court is affirmed.147 
C. Similarities and Differences between the Martin and Olinger 
Decisions 
1. Similarities 
Although the Martin and Olinger decisions reached contrary re-
sults, and could arguably have different effects on future plaintiffs,148 
 
 145. See id. 
 146. Id. at 1007. 
 147. Id. 
 148. In assessing the current state of the law with regard to professional golf’s walking 
rule and the ADA, it is important to remember that Ford Olinger’s and Casey Martin’s lawsuits 
were against different defendants. About all that can be said is that a federal district court sit-
ting in the Ninth Circuit would be bound by the Martin decision in a case against the PGA, 
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commentators should not hastily proclaim a circuit split. The cases 
share more similarities than differences. Once the two cases dis-
pensed with the public accommodation issue149 they both moved to 
a discussion of fundamental alteration. Initially, both cases ap-
proached the issue with similar legal analyses. Both courts agreed 
that the use of a golf cart was “reasonable in the general sense” and 
that under the Johnson analysis150 the burden shifted to the defendant 
to prove that the use of a golf cart would fundamentally alter the na-
ture of the championship competition. Both courts evaluated the 
purpose behind the walking rule and accepted professional golf’s 
contention that the purpose of the walking rule was to inject an ele-
ment of fatigue into the competition. 
The next question that both courts faced was whether the walk-
ing rule truly injected a significant fatigue factor into the central 
competition of shot making. Again, at this point neither court was 
looking at Casey Martin’s or Ford Olinger’s individualized circum-
stances. Both courts framed the question similarly. Would walking 
give a significant advantage to a “normal” competitor? Put another 
way, does riding a cart really make a difference? The courts consid-
ered evidence from different sources in considering this question. 
 
and a federal district court sitting in the Seventh Circuit would be bound by the Olinger deci-
sion in a case against the USGA. Besides those binding effects, both opinions would be consid-
ered no more than persuasive authority. The USGA has indicated that they will allow Casey 
Martin to ride a cart in the U.S. Open, but they stand by their position that no other golfers 
will be allowed to ride. Obviously, much depends on how the Supreme Court decides to re-
solve the issue in Martin. 
 149. The two cases took a different view of whether Title III covers professional golf as-
sociations. The defendants in both the Martin and Olinger cases argued that under a “zone” 
theory, the actual field of competition is not covered under Title III. The Martin court 
squarely holds that the PGA is an operator of a place of public accommodation, noting that the 
relevant precedent holds that Title III applies to the playing field, not just the stands. The 
court criticizes the premise of the PGA’s zone argument that there is nothing public about the 
competition itself. The PGA argued that the fact that its tournaments are restricted to the na-
tion’s best golfers means that the courses on which they play during tournaments cannot be 
places of public accommodations. The court responded that the fact that the users of a facility 
are highly selected does not mean that the facility cannot be a public accommodation. See Mar-
tin, 204 F.3d at 998. The court analogized to the nation’s elite universities. Although compe-
tition to attend these universities is quite intense, and those that do not “make the cut” are 
excluded from the schools, the members that do get admitted and get to use the facilities are 
still members of the public using the universities as places of public accommodation. In con-
trast, the Olinger court declined to answer the question of whether the actual field of competi-
tion, “their actual fields of strife—where Packers battle Bears and Cubs play Cardinals,” would 
be covered by Title III as public accommodations. Olinger 205 F.3d at 1005.  
 150. Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spotzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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The district court in Martin noted the testimony of Dr. Gary Klug, a 
professor in physiology at the University of Oregon. Dr. Klug, an 
expert on the physiological basis for fatigue, calculated that approxi-
mately five hundred calories are expended in walking a golf course 
(five miles in five hours).151 Dr. Klug also testified that it was likely 
that Ken Venturi’s fatigue in his storied 1964 U.S. Open victory was 
induced by heat exhaustion and fluid loss, not walking. Many specta-
tors at the 1964 U.S. Open had to be treated for exhaustion as well 
and they were not walking. According to Dr. Klug, fatigue at lower 
intensity exercise is primarily a psychological phenomenon; stress and 
motivation are the key ingredients. The district court further noted 
that the evidence at trial indicated that even when they had the 
choice, most PGA Tour golfers appeared to prefer walking as a way 
of dealing with the psychological factors of fatigue, even when they 
had the choice of using a cart. The court doubted that they would 
do so if they would receive an advantage from riding.152 The Ninth 
Circuit accepted all of the district court’s findings as not clearly erro-
neous. 
The district court in Olinger excluded Dr. Klug’s testimony for 
want of sufficient showing of reliability of underlying scientific prin-
ciples.153 The court noted the testimony of Dr. James Rippe, an ex-
pert in the physiology of walking, who testified that an average 
twenty-five to thirty-five year-old golfer who rides a cart for an aver-
age round of golf on an average summer day had a significant and 
unfair advantage over an average able-bodied twenty-five to thirty-
five year-old golfer who is walking.154 Olinger criticized Dr. Rippe’s 
study on multiple grounds, but the court did not find any of them 
persuasive. The court believed that Dr. Rippe’s report provided a 
strong basis to believe that between two roughly similar golfers, the 
golfer who rides is likely to have some advantage over the golfer who 
walks when it comes to fatigue.155 The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals accepted these findings as not clearly erroneous. 
 
 151. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250. 
 152. See id. at 1251. 
 153. See Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 932. 
 154. Id. at 935. “The person who walks the course under those conditions performs the 
same amount of physiologic work as if he had run 11-minute miles for 2.5 hours, and studies 
indicate that such exertion causes cognitive and psychomotor tasks to deteriorate at rates be-
tween 10 and 50 percent.” Id. 
 155. See id. at 936. 
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2. Differences 
At this point the courts diverged and made different factual find-
ings. The Martin court wrote: “[T]he fatigue factor injected into the 
game of golf by walking the course cannot be deemed significant 
under normal circumstances.”156 The district court in Olinger 
phrased its finding slightly differently, writing: “[T]he court finds 
not that a golfer who rides invariably has a competitive advantage 
over a very similar golfer who walks; the court finds only that a 
strong possibility exists that on any particular day, such a competitive 
advantage might exist, and that it might be substantial.”157 
These divergent factual findings are the key difference between 
the two cases and set the stage for different legal analyses from that 
point on. The Martin court, finding that the fatigue factor intro-
duced by walking was not significant, proceeded to do an individual-
ized analysis as to whether waiving the walking rule would give Ca-
sey Martin an advantage. The Martin court concluded it would not. 
The PGA argued that it was improper for the district court to con-
sider whether Martin’s condition was such that riding would not give 
him an unfair advantage over golfers who walked.158 The PGA ar-
gued that this would be far too burdensome, if not impossible.159 
The court rejected this proposition, noting that nothing in the re-
cord established that an individualized determination would impose 
an intolerable burden on the PGA.160 Indeed, the Martin court rec-
ognized that the district court had little difficulty making the factual 
determination that providing Martin with a golf cart did not give 
him an unfair advantage over his competitors.161 
In contrast, the Olinger court, finding that the fatigue factor in-
troduced by walking was significant, did not do an individualized 
analysis as to whether waiving the rule would give Ford Olinger an 
advantage. Rather, the court held that to modify the rule at all would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the USGA. Unlike the Martin 
court, the Olinger court was hostile to the idea of an individualized 
analysis. The district court accepted the testimony of Dr. James 
 
 156. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000 (quoting the district court, 994 F. Supp. at 1250). 
 157. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 936. 
 158. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000. 
 159. See id. at 1001. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. 
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Rippe that such an analysis could not be provided because the variety 
of potential disabilities and the individual impact of each disability 
was too great.162 The court agreed with the USGA that it did not 
need to develop “a system and fund of expertise to determine 
whether a given applicant truly needs, or merely wants, or could use 
but does not need, to ride a cart to compete.”163 Rather, the court 
was content with expert testimony that if some competitors rode 
carts, there would be tremendous advantage to those players. 
Aside from their different factual findings, and different legal 
analyses in light of these findings, there is one additional difference 
between the two cases. This final difference concerns the two courts’ 
tone when discussing professional golf. The Martin decision is rela-
tively straightforward in its legal analysis. Regardless of its outcome, 
the attitude of the court seems to be that golf is no different from 
any other industry. The fact that the PGA is so illustrious and com-
petitive is stated when appropriate for the analysis and not dwelt on. 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Olinger at times 
reads more like a USGA promotional brochure than a federal circuit 
court opinion. It seems important to the court to make two points 
concerning the USGA: (1) its practices and traditions are an impor-
tant part of its appeal; and (2) competition is so fierce, that any little 
element can make a difference in the end score. However, irrespec-
tive of the propriety of these points, the court goes overboard in 
making them. No less than twenty-two professional golfers are men-
tioned, by name, in the opinion. Furthermore, counting conserva-
tively, a reader of the opinion is exposed to at least nine completely 
irrelevant tidbits and stories from golf’s history, which take up almost 
half of the opinion’s text. These include the fact that Payne Stewart’s 
father always insisted he use his formal name on his U.S. Open appli-
cation; the fact that Willie Anderson—a four-time U.S. Open win-
ner—was a Scotsman who immigrated to the United States just be-
fore the turn of the century; and the fact that in his testimony golfer 
Ken Venturi felt compelled to discuss which putts he felt he should 
have made in the 1964 U.S. Open. 
Obviously different commentators have different views on what 
style opinions should be written in, and it is presumptuous to sug-
gest that colorful opinions are always wrong. Yet a careful read of the 
 
 162. See Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d. at 937. 
 163. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1006 (quoting the district court, 55 F. Supp. 2d. at 937). 
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Olinger opinion makes one wonder: was the court being truthful 
when it wrote that the “focus of our opinion has been on one ques-
tion: Must the USGA allow Ford Olinger to compete while riding in 
a golf cart;”164 or was the focus really on the majesty of professional 
golf?165 There is nothing wrong with a judge or court having admira-
tion for golf, or its players. Yet Ford Olinger, reading this opinion, 
must have felt like Curt Flood challenging Major League Baseball in 
Flood v. Kuhn,166 and wondered if he stood any chance on his factual 
or legal arguments in the face of a court enamored with the tradi-
tions and majesty of his sport. Olinger’s comments after receiving 
the opinion are understandable: “Casey had three judges who at-
tacked the legal issues, whereas I got golfers for judges.”167 
D. Why Martin and Olinger Will Not Work as Models for Future Cases 
The Martin and Olinger opinions started the process of applying 
the ADA to professional sports and admirably grappled with some 
difficult questions. In particular, both cases are to be applauded for 
rejecting the idea that professional sports are categorically exempt 
from the ADA. As previously discussed, this position has no support 
in the text of the ADA, or in its legislative history. This was an im-
portant first step and provides a basis from which this interaction be-
tween the ADA and professional sports can move forward. 
However, neither case provides a coherent model by which 
courts can decide future professional sports rule-modification ADA 
cases. There are two reasons for this. First, neither court asks the 
questions necessary to make the factual determination as to whether 
a rule is fundamental to a sport. Second, taken together and indi-
vidually, the two cases do not present a definitive legal analysis as to 
whether and when the defendant must present proof of the plaintiff’s 
individualized circumstances in proving a fundamental alteration. 
 
 164. Id. at 1007. 
 165. The adjectives used to describe the USGA and the U.S. Open throughout the opin-
ion are “venerable,” “greatest,” “most democratic,” “premier,” and “historic.” The adjectives 
used to describe USGA golfers and courses are “meccas,” “legends,” “storied,” and “amaz-
ing.”  Id. at 1001–07. 
 166. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). In 1972, Curt Flood, a major league baseball player, chal-
lenged Major League Baseball’s longstanding exemption from federal antitrust laws. He lost. 
In one famous paragraph, Justice Blackmun listed 89 celebrated baseball players by name. 
 167. Golf Cart Rulings: The Battle Isn’t Over Yet, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 20, 2000, 
at 40 (quoting Ford Olinger). 
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1. Problems with factual analysis 
Both the Martin and Olinger cases first attempt to determine 
whether the walking rule is fundamental to professional golf. Both 
courts accept the idea that equal competition is a fundamental value 
to all sports, including golf. As such, both courts reason that if the 
walking rule influences scoring in golf, then the rule is fundamental 
to the game. To determine whether the walking rule influences 
score, both courts attempted to make the factual determination of 
whether the fatigue introduced by walking affected a “normal” 
golfer’s score. 
This factual determination was crucial to both courts’ decisions. 
To be sure, both opinions admirably grappled with an extremely dif-
ficult factual question. However, in making this particular factual ac-
commodation, both courts could have improved on their analysis. It 
would have been helpful to focus more on the particular physical 
trait that the rule tests for and to evaluate how specialized that skill 
is. Also, the courts should have considered how athletes prepare for 
competition—do they practice this particular trait or skill? In particu-
lar, the Olinger definition of competitive advantage168 is somewhat 
ambiguous—it is hard to imagine what factors could not influence 
score on any given day. 
On a more serious issue, both courts missed the mark in relying 
solely on the idea of competitive disadvantage to determine what 
rules are fundamental to a given sport. Certainly both courts were 
correct that ensuring all athletes receive no competitive advantage is 
fundamental to a sport. Yet this is not all that is fundamental to 
sports. In addition to the competitive advantage problem, some rules 
are so embedded in the game that even if modification would pre-
sent no competitive advantage problem, they should not be changed. 
Tradition is not irrelevant. If certain “core” rules are modified, the 
game will become something different. These rules might not have 
any better explanation than “the game has always been played this 
way.”169 Neither the Martin nor Olinger opinions treat these as suffi-
 
 168. “The court finds not that a golfer who rides invariably has a competitive advantage 
over a very similar golfer who walks; the court finds only that a strong possibility exists that on 
any particular day, such a competitive advantage might exist, and that it might be substantial.” 
Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 936. 
 169. Realistically, why else are the bases 90 feet apart in baseball, or the baskets 10 feet 
high in basketball. Why else are there three outs in a baseball inning or a first down every 10 
yards in football? 
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ciently distinct questions. The Olinger court especially seems to con-
fuse tradition with competitive advantage. The court clearly uses Ken 
Venturi’s testimony to evaluate the likelihood of competitive advan-
tage. While this testimony might well be probative as to the idea of 
walking as a “core” rule similar to the bases being ninety feet apart in 
baseball, Venturi’s story about Ben Hogan has little relevance to the 
competitive advantage inquiry. The questions of what rules make a 
sport what it is and what rules are incapable of being modified with-
out giving someone a competitive advantage are objectively difficult 
to answer. However, they are not the same question, and should not 
be treated as such. 
Also distinct from the idea of competitive advantage, both the 
USGA and PGA argued that it was too administratively difficult to 
modify rules for individual competitors and that such a waiver would 
in and of itself constitute fundamental change. The Martin court re-
jected this argument, but the Olinger court accepted it. In their 
holdings, however, neither court offered meaningful guidance on 
how to evaluate this argument in future cases. In particular, the 
Olinger court confuses the proof of administrative difficulty with the 
proof of competitive advantage. The court held that it would be a 
fundamental change to force the USGA to administrate on a case-by-
case basis who would receive a waiver from the walking rule because 
the USGA has never granted a systematic “advantage” to one com-
petitor over another. Although this presents an argument about 
competitive advantage, it does not answer the question of adminis-
trative difficulty. Even if case-by-case waivers would be distasteful to 
the USGA, they are not necessarily unduly burdensome. 
2. Problems with legal analysis 
A second problem with using the Olinger and Martin opinions 
as a comprehensive model for future cases deals with their legal 
analyses. Both cases are unclear as to whether a defendant is always 
required to give proof that modifying the rule for a particular plain-
tiff will fundamentally change the entity, or whether the defendant 
does not have to present individualized proof if the rule itself is fun-
damental to the sport. Can a rule that is “essential” or “necessary” 
be modified if, given the plaintiff’s individualized circumstances, that 
plaintiff’s accommodation does not disturb what makes the rule fun-
damental or significant? 
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The Martin case in particular is ambiguous on this point. Given 
the path the Martin court took, it is not clear whether the court 
would have forced the defendant to present individualized proof if 
the court had found that walking a course had more of an impact on 
competition. Would the court have engaged in an individualized 
analysis and determined whether the cart gave Casey Martin an ad-
vantage over other golfers? Or would the court have done what the 
Olinger court did and reason that if a rule significantly affects the 
central competition, then that rule can never be modified? Although 
the Martin court went to great lengths to point out the necessity of 
an individualized analysis of Casey Martin’s situation, the determina-
tion that the fatigue walking generates was not significant came be-
fore the individualized analysis.170 
a. Always individualized analysis. The court’s language in Mar-
tin suggests that it would have engaged in some type of individual-
ized analysis even if it had found the walking rule to be more signifi-
cant. The court approvingly cited Judge Arnold’s dissent in Pottgen, 
noting: “[W]e do not share the antagonism to individual determina-
tions reflected in these cases [Pottgen, Sandison, and McPherson].”171 
The thrust of Judge Arnold’s view is that a rule cannot be “funda-
mental” if modifying it in the individual case does no violence to its 
purpose. If Casey Martin or Ford Olinger will always be more tired 
after riding a course than the rest of the competitors will be after rid-
ing, then modifying the rule clearly gives them no advantage. Also, if 
the entire holding was based on the walking rule not injecting any 
significant element into the competition, one has to wonder why the 
court felt compelled to determine whether Casey Martin would re-
ceive an unfair advantage if the rule was waived. Indeed, almost by 
definition, no one would. 
As discussed previously, the view that there must always be an 
individualized analysis, a view that Martin hints at, has support in 
the case law.172 This approach also has an intuitive appeal. Winners 
and losers are determined in all sports on the basis of performance. 
 
 170. “We cannot tell whether a golf cart for Martin fundamentally alters the competition 
without first investigating whether walking is fundamental to the competition.” Martin, 204 
F.3d at 1001. 
 171. Id. at 1002. 
 172. See Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 181 F.3d 840, 852 (7th Cir. 
1999); see also Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926, 932–33 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (Aronld, J., dissenting). 
5WAT-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1528 
The competition is fairest when none of the athletes possess an ad-
vantage that the other athletes do not. As the district court in Olin-
ger stated, “[T]he point of an athletic competition . . . is to decide 
who, under conditions that are about the same for everyone, can 
perform an assigned set of tasks better than (not as well as) any other 
competitor.”173 It follows that if a competitor is not getting an ad-
vantage from a certain accommodation, and it is just putting her on 
equal footing with other competitors, then the competition is not 
being made unfair by granting her the modification. Even if one ac-
cepts that the walking rule injects fatigue into the game of golf, and 
accepts that fatigue influences score, if Casey Martin or Ford Olinger 
will always be more fatigued after a round of “riding” golf than a 
healthy Tiger Woods or David Duvall will be after a round of “walk-
ing” golf, then certainly they are gaining no unfair advantage. The 
modification can be made without damaging the competitive aspect 
of the game. 
This is not a workable principle, nor one that is required under 
the ADA. If a court were to always require individualized proof that 
waiving a particular rule, which admittedly affected competition, 
would give that athlete a competitive advantage, any sport could be 
fundamentally altered by the ADA. As discussed above, the only fac-
tual analysis that both courts engaged in (prior to the decision to do 
or not do an individualized analysis) was a competition-based in-
quiry. However, there is more that is fundamental to a sport besides 
the premise that all athletes start from as equal a place as possible. 
Sprinters should always start from the same place, even if a disabled 
sprinter can show that given her disability, to remain equal with 
other competitors she must be given a head start. The baskets in the 
NBA should be kept at ten feet, even if a growth-impaired player 
wants to move them down to nine feet for all games that he plays in 
and can demonstrate that he makes baskets on this modified hoop 
with less precision than other players. 
Although these are extreme examples, they demonstrate the 
point. There are elements to professional sports, as in every employ-
ment or public accommodation situation that cannot be modified 
without creating fundamental change, in spite of any compelling set 
of individualized circumstances. The Southeastern case teaches this 
 
 173. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 937. 
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principle.174 It is not a desirable nor reasonable application of the 
ADA to require that the baskets be changed for all players. Although 
the aforementioned basketball player would garner no advantage 
from nine-foot baskets, the height of the baskets cannot be altered 
without fundamentally changing the game. Whether a particular 
player garners an advantage cannot be the only inquiry. These rules 
affect competition, yet the player gains no competitive advantage 
from the rule being waived. There must be some category of rules 
that cannot be modified, regardless of any individualized circum-
stances. The Martin decision recognizes this, stating that accommo-
dations such as the examples above would not have to be made, be-
cause “fact-based inquiries into the effects of such accommodations 
would result in rulings that those accommodations fundamentally al-
tered the competitions.”175 However, Martin fails to supply a set of 
questions by which to make this determination and does not clearly 
establish whether an individualized analysis is appropriate given the 
answer of the fact-based inquiry. 
b. Never individualized analysis. The other approach, specifically 
endorsed by Olinger and not inconsistent with the holding in Mar-
tin, would be to never do an individualized analysis if the rule at is-
sue adds any significant element to the competitive nature of the 
game. A strict application of this rule is also undesirable and is incon-
sistent with ADA purposes and case law. In essence, such a rule 
would be a blanket policy (“all rules that really affect competition are 
not modifiable”), and the ADA case law is clear such blanket policies 
are frowned upon.176 Sports have many rules, and there will be some 
that do affect competition, perhaps even in a “significant manner,” 
but should nonetheless be modifiable. 
A non-hypothetical example is instructive. Major League Baseball 
rules require that a pitcher be completely motionless prior to delivery 
once his foot is on the pitching rubber.177 However, a pitcher needs 
to spin the ball in his hand to get the proper grip on the ball for the 
particular pitch to be thrown. To follow the rule, pitchers hide the 
 
 174. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979). 
 175. Martin, 204 F.3d at 1001. 
 176. See Bombrys v. Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210, 1219–20 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (“The 
Americans with Disabilities Act makes it clear that blanket exclusions are to be given the ut-
most scrutiny, and are, as a general rule, to be discouraged.”). 
 177. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES Rule 8.01 (2000) 
(“Legal Pitching Delivery”). 
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ball in their glove while they are getting their grip with their other 
hand, and then put their foot on the rubber and come to the re-
quired stop. 
Jim Abbott, a one-armed pitcher, could not hide the ball in his 
glove hand while he was spinning the ball. The only way he could 
adjust his grip without tipping off the batter as to what pitch he was 
throwing was to adjust the ball with his pitching hand, with his hand 
behind his back, after he had already put his foot on the rubber. 
However, to do so would violate the “motionless” rule. To modify 
the rule would in some sense give Abbott an advantage over other 
pitchers and batters. He could disguise his pitches in a way that other 
pitchers could not. Yet Major League Baseball officials granted Jim 
Abbott an exception from this particular rule. 
To be sure, the “motionless” rule does influence competition. It 
maintains equality among all pitchers and forces them to do the same 
thing. Exempting Jim Abbot from the rule could be said to give him 
an advantage; for without the modification, he would have gotten 
clobbered. However, Major League Baseball, without being threat-
ened with any potential ADA litigation, made the determination that 
given Jim Abbott’s individualized circumstances, modifying the rule 
would not give him any significant advantage. Rather, the exception 
merely allowed him to compete. Quite simply, Major League Base-
ball made a common sense decision, which no one could reasonably 
claim ruined or altered the game. As Jim Abbott himself said, “I 
wasn’t given an advantage. I was merely being allowed to do some-
thing that everyone else was able to do naturally.”178 
The point of this example is to illustrate that an approach which 
states any rule that affects competition cannot be modified given any 
set of individualized circumstances would preclude a potential plain-
tiff from using the ADA to force a Jim Abbott-type result if her sport 
would not do so on its own. Sports are a rule-dominated world, and 
not all of these rules that affect competition are incapable of being 
modified without fundamentally altering the sport. The example of 
Jim Abbott is a positive one—Major League Baseball adequately po-
liced itself and accommodated Jim Abbott. However, there was no 
guarantee that it would have done so. Given the importance of tradi-
tion in sports, and the fact that almost any rule could be considered 
to affect competition at some level, an athlete might well need the 
 
 178. Sports Extra Chatter, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 27, 1998, at 6 (quoting Jim Abbott). 
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ADA to force her sport to do the common sense thing and perform 
an individualized analysis of whether an athlete really gathers an un-
fair advantage to a minor rule change. 
In sum, problems with the Martin and Olinger courts’ legal and 
factual analyses preclude them from being comprehensive models for 
cases of this type. It is unacceptable to always have an individualized 
analysis; however, it is just as undesirable to never have one. Clearly, 
a new approach is needed. 
V. A PROPOSED APPROACH 
There are commentators who dismiss Casey Martin’s and Ford 
Olinger’s struggles with professional golf as isolated incidents.179 
This is an unrealistic view. JaRo Jones, a former golf teaching pro 
with polio, recently filed a lawsuit against the USGA, based on a de-
nial of his request to use a cart during the Senior Open qualifying 
rounds.180 Future cases will not be limited to golf. Every sport has 
rules, and it is not hard to imagine cases where an athlete can effec-
tively compete in the sport but cannot abide by a particular rule.181 
In formulating an approach to dealing with these situations, uni-
formity of process should be important. The ADA has been criti-
cized, in some instances quite legitimately, for inconsistent applica-
tion.182 Cases involving professional sports are likely to be high-
profile, and as the body of ADA case law continues to evolve, deci-
sions like Martin and Olinger will serve as precedent for the ADA’s 
application to other competitive situations.183 No one’s interests will 
be served by a scattered body of case-law, especially if it applies the 
ADA in different ways depending on the popularity of the sport or of 
a particular athlete. 
 
 179. See Alex B. Long, A Good Walk Spoiled: Casey Martin and the ADA’s Reasonable 
Accommodation Requirement in Competitive Settings, 77 OR. L. REV. 1337, 1377 (1998) (“In 
reality, it may turn out that professional golf is one of the few sports where an accommodation 
of one of the major rules of play might not fundamentally alter the nature of the game.”). 
 180. See Jim Vertuno, Yahoo Sports Headlines (visited May 1, 2000) <http://dailynews. 
yahoo.com/h/ap/20000501/sp/glf_disabled_golfer_lawsuit-1.html>. 
 181. The possibility for future Martin-like or Olinger-like suits is increased by the fact 
that these suits are not limited to Title III public accommodations. As discussed in Part II, it is 
possible that professional athletic ADA suits will proceed under Title I of the ADA. 
 182. Consider the comments of JaRo Jones: “I have nothing against Casey, but I don’t 
understand how they can deny me the use of a golf cart when they turned around and said he 
could use one.” Vertuno, supra note 180. 
 183. See Long, supra note 179, at 1377–79. 
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As demonstrated above, there are two major problems with the 
Martin and Olinger cases. The first is that they use an incomplete set 
of questions to determine the factual issue of how important a rule is 
to the sport. The second is that neither case presents a coherent vi-
sion of the legal analysis a court should use in addressing the rela-
tionship between the ADA, professional sports, and disabled players 
(specifically, when and whether a court should require an individual-
ized analysis in determining whether a rule modification will funda-
mentally alter the competition). These problems are interrelated. 
The approach this article proposes will remedy both of these prob-
lems and provide a workable legal and factual framework that courts 
can use in future ADA professional sports cases. This approach is in-
tended to separate rules which are essential and cannot be modified 
from those that can, and to determine whether and when a particular 
requested accommodation should in fact be made. 
A. Outlining the Approach 
The proposed approach contains three steps. At the first step the 
plaintiff-athlete has the burden to demonstrate that the requested ac-
commodation is reasonable in a general sense. If the plaintiff is able 
to meet this burden then, under step two of the proposed analysis, 
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the asked-for change 
would fundamentally alter the game. At this point, before the defen-
dant has to offer proof that a modification for this particular plaintiff 
would fundamentally alter the sport, the defendant must be allowed 
to show that the rule is so important that any deviation from it 
would generate fundamental change. If so, the rule cannot be 
changed, and the analysis is over. This is an extremely difficult factual 
inquiry, and this article will propose a question set that goes far be-
yond the analysis in either the Martin or Olinger cases for reaching 
an answer to that inquiry. Finally, under step three of the proposed 
analysis, if the defendant cannot demonstrate that the rule is so im-
portant to the sport that it can never be changed, then the defendant 
must prove that modifying the rule for this particular plaintiff would 
cause fundamental change. At this point, the court must undertake 
an individualized analysis of this plaintiff’s circumstances. If the de-
fendant cannot demonstrate, with specificity, that making this indi-
vidualized exception would cause fundamental change, then the ac-
commodation must be made. The approach will first be discussed in  
 
5WAT-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:45 PM 
1489] Why the ADA Will Not Ruin Professional Sports 
 1533 
the context of a Title III lawsuit. Afterward, the article will demon-
strate that the approach will also fit a Title I case. 
B. Step 1: Reasonable in the General Sense 
This first step of the proposed approach is in accord with the 
methodology applied in both the Martin and Olinger cases. Under 
both Johnson and Riel, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating 
that the requested accommodation is reasonable in a general sense. 
As defined in Johnson,184 this means “reasonable in the run of cases.” 
This is not a heavy burden. It is an initial screen that can curb out-
landish proposed rule changes. In Martin, the court noted that be-
cause many golfers use golf carts, the reasonableness of using golf 
carts in the game of golf as a general matter cannot be contested.185 
Of course, it is possible to increase the level of specificity at this 
stage of the analysis and make it more of a rigorous inquiry. For ex-
ample, assume that a Major League Baseball player requests that he 
be exempted from the rule that requires batters to use wood bats.186 
As an accommodation, this player wants to use an aluminum bat. 
Under the more relaxed analysis, this requested accommodation 
would survive this stage, because many professional baseball players, 
at levels other than the major leagues, use aluminum bats. However, 
at a higher level of specificity, one could argue that Major League 
Baseball players never use aluminum bats, and therefore the re-
quested accommodation is not reasonable in the general sense. 
The more relaxed inquiry is more appropriate for this initial stage 
of the analysis because after step one the burden shifts and the analy-
sis becomes more complex. Steps two and three of the proposed 
method of analysis are the more appropriate places to resolve the 
more difficult, less glaring issues. This approach is in accord with the  
way courts have interpreted the Johnson burden for other indus-
tries.187 
 
 184. Johnson, 116 F.3d at 353. 
 185. See Martin, 204 F.3d at 999. 
 186. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES Rule 1.10(a) (2000). 
 187. See Borkowski v. Valley Central Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) (refer-
ring to this initial burden as “not a heavy one,” and stating “[i]t is enough for the plaintiff to 
suggest the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly 
exceed its benefits”); see also Guckenberger v. Boston University, 974 F. Supp. 106, 146–47 
(D. Mass. 1997) (finding that the plaintiffs had met this initial burden by showing that course 
substitutions were reasonable in the general sense). 
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C. Step 2: Can the Rule Ever Be Waived? 
If the plaintiff is able to meet her burden in step one by demon-
strating that the proposed accommodation is reasonable, the case 
continues to step two of the proposed analysis. Step two separates 
rules that can never be waived without causing fundamental change 
from those that can. At this stage, the burden is placed on the de-
fendant to demonstrate that the rule can never be changed without 
fundamentally altering the game. The defendant does not need to 
show that waiving the rule for this particular plaintiff would cause 
fundamental change, but simply that changing the rule itself will 
fundamentally alter the game. Allowing the defendant to make her 
case before an individualized analysis takes place is an acknowledg-
ment that there are some rules that cannot be modified without fun-
damentally changing the sport regardless of the individualized cir-
cumstances of any plaintiff. 
The question the courts will address then is: “Can this rule ever 
be waived?” There should be only three broad ways to answer “no” 
to this question. The first is if the rule change would change the 
game into something it is not. The second is if the rule change will 
always produce a competitive advantage or disadvantage. The third is 
if the rule change is impossible to administer. These are three diffi-
cult questions to address, and finding an answer to them requires a 
comprehensive, intensive factual inquiry. This is an inquiry that the 
Martin and Olinger cases do not give. 
This article proposes that a court should ask seven questions to 
determine whether a requested rule change falls into one of the three 
broad categories above. These questions both improve the competi-
tive advantage inquiry initiated in Martin and Olinger and direct the 
analysis to additional relevant points. These questions all contribute 
to determining the true competitive effects of a rule change, the  
extent to which the rule transforms the game, and what the adminis-
trative burdens accompanying a waiver. 
The proposed questions are as follows. (1) Does the rule involve 
a skill that an athlete in the particular sport trains to do? (2) Is this 
particular skill unique to an athlete in the sport, or is it a task that the 
general population can perform? (3) What is the link between success 
in the skill the rule tests for and success in the sport? (4) Would the 
rule modification place other athletes at a competitive disadvantage? 
(5) Why does the league have this rule? (6) Would the rule modifica-
tion change the way the game is played for all participants? (7) What 
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is the realistic administrative and financial burden on the association 
in determining whether or not to waive this rule on a case-by-case 
basis? Individually none of these questions are determinative, but to-
gether they should isolate those rules that are so important to a par-
ticular game that they can never be changed. The answers to these 
questions interrelate and overlap. 
1. Question one: Does the rule involve a skill that an athlete in the 
particular sport trains to do? 
The first question is quite probative of the importance of a par-
ticular rule. Professional athletes are extremely competitive and look 
for every advantage they can get. If a certain skill will give them an 
edge over other competitors, it is reasonable to expect them to train 
at that skill and strive to get better at it. In contrast, if a skill is 
somewhat incidental to the game, they will not focus nearly as much 
effort on perfecting that skill. 
This question must be answered with the appropriate level of 
specificity. For example, the National Basketball Association has a 
rule that a player shooting a free throw only has ten seconds to shoot 
the ball after it is given to him.188 However, consider the case of a 
basketball player who has a mental disability, such as an obsessive-
compulsive disorder. This player needs to go through an elaborate 
ritual before shooting each free throw, and it takes twelve seconds 
He requests an exemption from the ten-second rule. Although there 
could be a correlation between increased time and increased free 
throw percentage, it is unlikely that most professional basketball 
players specifically train at making a free throw in ten seconds, as op-
posed to twelve or fifteen. This suggests that the rule is not so im-
portant as to be non-modifiable. Similarly, consider Jim Abbott’s 
case. Although the rule involved a central function of the sport 
(pitching), most pitchers do not seek to develop any particular skill 
in staying motionless before delivery. In contrast, consider an exam-
ple that kept coming up in the aftermath of the Martin case: a dis-
abled baseball player who is in a wheelchair, and cannot run to first 
base. Players do practice running to first base, and they train to get 
better at it. 
 
 188. See NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, OFFICIAL NATIONAL BASKETBALL 
ASSOCIATION RULES Rule 9 (2000) (setting out the time limit for free throws). 
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2. Question two: Is this particular skill unique to an athlete in the sport, 
or is it a task that the general population can perform? 
This second question focuses on how specialized the skill at issue 
really is. The more specialized the skill, the more reasonable it is to 
believe that modifying the rule could lead to a competitive advan-
tage. For example, most of the general population can hear a starting 
gun. This suggests that putting a flashing light in front of a deaf per-
son to represent the start of a race will not give her a competitive ad-
vantage. In contrast, most people in the general population cannot 
hit a major league fastball, run the forty-yard dash in the time of a 
NFL receiver, or hit a golf ball nearly as far as a professional golfer. 
Any modification that helps a disabled individual accomplish one of 
these tasks would likely give her a significant competitive advantage. 
3. Question three: What is the link between success in the skill the rule 
tests for and success in the sport? 
Question three focuses specifically on competitive advantage. 
Considering Jim Abbott’s case, not many professional pitchers have 
made careers based on any particular skill in being motionless. Sports 
have many rules, and not all of them involve a case where one ath-
lete’s gain is another athlete’s loss. The competitive advantage in-
quiry is another way a court can hone in on what exact effects a rule 
has on a sport.189 
4. Question four: Would the rule modification place other athletes at a 
competitive disadvantage? 
Question four is another way to evaluate competitive advantage. 
This is a way to recognize that sports can be different from other in-
dustries, because one competitor’s advantage can be another’s disad-
vantage.190 But this will not always be the case; sports have many 
rules, and not all of them involve a zero-sum gain. For example, Ma-
jor League Baseball rules only allow one manager or coach to visit 
the pitching mound, to talk with a pitcher, in the middle of an in-
 
 189. It is important to remember that the driving force behind this question is to deter-
mine whether the rule could ever be modified without causing fundamental alteration, given 
the most wild of imaginable circumstances. 
 190. See e.g., Long, supra note 179. 
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ning.191 However, allowing a sign language interpreter, as well as a 
coach or manager, to come to the mound for a deaf pitcher would 
not hurt anyone’s chances of hitting the ball. 
It is important to note that questions three and four should not 
screen out many rules at this stage of the analysis. The individualized 
inquiry is better suited to determine if a competitive advantage or 
competitive disadvantage exists. 
5. Question five: Why does the league have this rule? 
Question five will allow a league to argue that in addition to any 
competitive effects a rule has, the rule is a bedrock tenet of the game. 
It is quite possible the answer to this question will be: “[B]ecause 
the game has always been played like this,” or “because this rule 
makes our game what it is.” For example, why else are the bases in 
baseball ninety feet apart?192 Why else are baskets in basketball ten 
feet high?193 Every sport has “rules of the road,” and the fact that 
they have no impressive explanation should not degrade their impor-
tance. A court should listen to these arguments. Ultimately, how-
ever, the court must make an independent judgment as to whether 
this rule is so much a part of the game that it cannot be changed 
without transforming the game into something else. 
Another example is instructive. The National Basketball Associa-
tion’s Rules specifically mention the use of profanity as being 
grounds for a technical foul.194 A technical foul leads to a free throw 
shot for the opposing team and thus can directly affect the score of 
the game. Imagine a basketball player with Turret’s syndrome, a 
mental condition that can cause those with it to uncontrollably shout 
obscenities. Such a player would be assessed many technical fouls, 
which could preclude him from being able to play. This player re-
quests that he be exempted from this rule. This rule is not primarily 
intended to keep a competitive balance, but rather to keep a measure 
of civility and decorum in games. While perhaps a desirable goal, it is 
unlikely this could be cast as a bedrock tenant of the game of basket-
ball. 
 
 191. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES Rule 8.06 (2000). 
 192. Id. at Rule 1.04 (“The Playing Field”). 
 193. See NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, OFFICIAL NATIONAL BASKETBALL 
ASSOCIATION RULES Rule 1 (2000) (“Court Dimensions”). 
 194. Id. at Rule 12 (“Fouls and Penalties, VII: Conduct (d)(4)”). 
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6. Question six: Would the rule modification change the way the game 
is played for all participants? 
Question six is a crucial tool to help courts decide which rules 
cannot be modified without changing the nature of the game too 
drastically. Furthermore, it is essentially a specialized way to evaluate 
a league’s Southeastern arguments in a manner that is adapted to pro-
fessional sports. If a rule only has to be modified for one particular 
participant, and will not change the way that everyone plays the 
game, the modification’s disruptive effects may be lessened. 
For instance, consider the example given by the PGA in Martin 
of a height-impaired basketball player who wants to move the three-
point line closer to the basket for all games he plays in. This involves 
changing the line for everyone; not just that player. Even if the 
league could paint two separate three-point lines (one for the dis-
abled participant, and one for everyone else), the rule change would 
still affect everyone because the defense would need to actively adjust 
to that one player’s specialized circumstance. As such, it starts to 
look like a major change. In contrast, Major League Baseball only 
had to alter the motionless rule for Jim Abbott, not for every pitcher. 
Likewise, the NBA would only need to accommodate the mentally 
disabled basketball player who needs more free-throw time, not eve-
ryone else in the league. 
7. Question seven: What is the realistic administrative and financial 
burden on the association in determining whether or not to waive this 
rule on a case-by-case basis? 
With regard to the seventh question, it is not so much that Olin-
ger court did not ask this question, but that they did not answer it. 
The Olinger holding, that rule modification on a case-by-case basis 
would be administratively difficult and unnecessary, is woefully un-
supported in the opinion. The ADA is clear on how this argument 
must be evaluated. The most on-point provisions in the ADA deal 
with the “undue burden” Title I defense. Factors to be considered in 
evaluating administrative burdens must include “the nature and cost 
of the accommodation . . . the overall financial resources of the facil-
ity or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommo-
dation . . . the effect on expenses and resources . . . the overall finan-
cial resources of the covered entity with respect to the number of its 
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employees.”195 Careful review is needed here; blanket policies (“it is 
too difficult for us to evaluate the plaintiff’s evaluation on a case-by-
case basis”) are inherently suspect under the ADA.196 Given that all 
professional sports are extremely profitable, it is not likely that finan-
cial burdens will often work as a justification for not making accom-
modations. 
Although individually none of these questions are determinative, 
taken together they should isolate those rules that are so important 
to the game that they can never be changed. Furthermore, using 
these seven questions will keep this particular set of rules limited in a 
systematic way that the Martin nor Olinger decisions do not. If a 
challenged rule either (1) is so entwined in the central competition 
that it could never be modified without giving a competitive advan-
tage; (2) would change the game into something it is not; or (3) 
would be administratively impossible for a league to modify on a 
case-by-case basis, then that rule cannot be changed given any set of 
individualized circumstances. It is the defendant’s burden through-
out to prove that a rule belongs in this category. 
D. Step 3: The Individualized Analysis 
Having performed the above analysis, a court is in an appropriate 
position to evaluate the argument that, as applied to a particular 
plaintiff, a rule modification would cause fundamental change. This 
analysis will focus on whether a particular athlete gets an advantage 
from a rule modification. Although still difficult to answer, this third 
question is less hypothetical than the case of the “normal” athlete. 
For example, consider the case of the mentally disabled basketball 
player who needs more time at the free throw line. Does the addi-
tional time give him an advantage, or does it merely allow him to 
shoot free throws like everyone else? Are his twelve seconds equal to 
another player’s ten seconds? While this may be a tough questions to 
answer, other questions will not be as difficult. Consider Jim Ab-
bott’s case. There is likely little evidence that allowing Jim Abbott to 
modify his delivery gave him a competitive advantage over the bat-
ters he was facing. Allowing one basketball player with Turret’s syn-
 
 195. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (1994). 
 196. See Bombrys v. Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210, 1219–20 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (“The 
Americans with Disabilities Act makes it clear that blanket exclusions are to be given the ut-
most scrutiny, and are, as a general rule, to be discouraged.”). 
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drome to curse at an official would not compromise basketball’s ci-
vility. 
Again, this approach is clear (in a way that the Martin and Olin-
ger decisions are not) about when a defendant has to offer proof 
about the plaintiff’s individualized circumstances. If the rule is so 
important that it can never be changed without fundamentally 
changing the sport, no individualized analysis is necessary. However, 
under the approach proposed here, a rule must get past an intense 
and consistent set of factual questions to reach this category. 
E. Application of this Approach to Title I 
The approach proposed in this article can be extended beyond 
Title III and into the Title I context. The Title I “undue burden” 
defense incorporates the Title III “fundamental alteration” test. 
“While Title I provides an undue hardship defense and Title III pro-
vides a fundamental alteration defense, fundamental alteration is 
merely a particular type of undue hardship.”197 There is little sub-
stantive difference between the two inquiries.198 Once the plaintiff 
discharges her initial burden under Johnson,199 the burden remains on 
the defendant league to prove that the requested accommodation 
would be unduly burdensome. Essentially, what is “unduly burden-
some” will be the same as what is “fundamentally altering.”200 As in a 
Title III case, the defendant in a Title I situation should have an op-
portunity to use the questions proposed here and prove that the rule 
at question can never be modified without being unduly burden-
some. If the defendant cannot make that showing, she must demon-
strate that waiving the rule for this particular plaintiff will be unduly 
burdensome. 
 
 
 197. Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059. See also Sharpe, supra note 47, at 799 (“The closest 
thing to Title I’s undue hardship defense is the . . . fundamental alteration defense.”). 
 198. See Dahlberg v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (D. Colo. 2000). 
 199. Under Title I, this will include the additional burden of proving that the plaintiff, 
with the requested accommodation, can still perform the essential functions of the position, as 
determined by the court. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). 
 200. This includes rules that cannot be modified without causing competitive advantage,  
too germane to the way the game is played, or too administratively difficult to waive on a case-
by-case basis. 
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F. Criticisms of this Approach 
It is likely that criticism of this approach will focus on two areas. 
First, critics may argue that not having an individualized analysis in 
every case violates the ADA regulations and case law. Second, from 
the other side, it may be argued that this approach will allow too 
many cases to proceed to the individualized analysis inquiry; courts 
will too often be called upon to make near impossible determina-
tions. Each of these criticisms will be addressed in turn. 
1. The need for individualized analysis in every case 
As discussed above, there is a line of cases, culminating with 
Washington, that stand for the proposition that a court cannot con-
sider the general purposes behind a rule without considering the ef-
fect an exception for a disabled individual would have on those pur-
poses.201 To take the example in Washington: if the purpose behind 
an eight-semester rule is to prohibit red-shirting,202 and it is obvious 
that the individual requesting a waiver from the rule is not red-
shirting, then there should be no problem making an exception. A 
court should not consider the importance of the red-shirting rule to 
the game or program in a vacuum. As Washington discussed, this line 
of reasoning is supported by the ADA regulations,203 which stress the 
importance of the individualized analysis, the Arline case,204 and 
some commentators’ views.205 
 
 
 201. See Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 181 F.3d 840, 851 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
 202. Redshirting is the practice of deliberately holding children back in school so they 
will be bigger and more developed than their classmates, and thus have an advantage in athlet-
ics. 
 203. See 28 C.F.R. app. A § 35 (1999) (“Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination 
on Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services”). 
 204. 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987). 
 205. See Colleen M. Evale, Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n: The Sixth 
Circuit Sets up Age Restrictions as Insurmountable Hurdles for Learning-Disabled High School 
Student-Athletes, 5 SPORTS L.J. 109, 134 (1998); Mark R. Freitas, Applying the Rehabilitation 
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act to Student-Athletes, 5 SPORTS L.J. 139, 162 
(1998); Adam Milani, Can I Play? The Dilemma of the Disabled Athlete in Interscholastic Sports, 
49 ALA. L. REV. 817 (1998); Katie M. Burroughs, Learning Disabled Student Athletes: A 
Sporting Chance Under the ADA?, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 57 (1997); John T. 
Wolohan, Are Age Restrictions a Necessary Requirement for Participation in Interscholastic Ath-
letic Programs?, 66 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 345 (1997). 
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This article, and the method of analysis it proposes, does not in-
tend to denigrate the importance of the individualized analysis. 
However, as discussed above, we must realize that it is an impossibil-
ity in every case. None of the aforementioned commentators address 
this reality, nor has the case law yet demanded that it be considered. 
The fact that the baskets are ten feet in basketball is so central to the 
game that it can never be changed. This is true even if a disabled par-
ticipant, given his individualized circumstances, gains no advantage 
from lowering the baskets. Once we agree that there is some level of 
rules that can never be changed, regardless of any particularly com-
pelling set of individualized circumstances, we must develop a 
method of analysis to separate changeable rules from unchangeable 
rules. That is the analysis that this article provides. 
Moreover, in practice, this approach will not be inconsistent with 
the approach used in Washington and Pottgen. Under this approach, 
the age rule at issue in Washington would eventually proceed to the 
individualized analysis stage. Courts would just not reach that stage 
until the defendant has a chance to show that age rules are “essen-
tial” to the sport as a general matter. Although age rules can affect 
competition, a defendant would not be able to show that they are 
incapable of being modified without influencing competition. More-
over, they would not change the way the game is played for every-
one. 
2. Hostility to individualized determinations 
Some may also argue that the proposed approach will allow too 
many cases to proceed to the individualized analysis inquiry. This 
line of criticism is evident in the Olinger decision. The Olinger opin-
ion’s blanket hostility to this individualized analysis is misguided. An 
individualized determination will be difficult, but it will not always 
be impossible. Since the burden is still on the league, they must at 
least conclusively prove that such a determination will be impossible 
in this specific instance. Courts are called upon to make difficult fac-
tual findings all the time, in all areas of law. Quite simply, that is 
their job. As always, this determination will have to be based on the 
totality of the record, including expert testimony. There are rules of 
evidence that place external limits on evidence that is too speculative 
to be admitted.206 
 
 206. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“Testimony By Experts”); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
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G. The Test Applied—The Walking Rule in Professional Golf 
The approach advocated here would provide a superior result in 
both Casey Martin’s and Ford Olinger’s cases. It would allow for a 
more comprehensive judging of the importance of the walking rule 
to golf as a general matter and would clarify when it is appropriate to 
address whether waiving the walking rule gives either of the two 
golfers a competitive advantage. At this point, this is more than an 
academic exercise; the Supreme Court will soon be deciding this is-
sue. 
It is likely that both Martin and Olinger can demonstrate that us-
ing a golf cart during a competition meets the Johnson test and is a 
reasonable accommodation when looked at in the general run of 
cases. Therefore, the analysis of this particular situation would likely 
proceed to step two of the proposed approach, and the PGA or 
USGA would have to prove that the walking rule can never be modi-
fied without fundamentally changing the sport. To address this issue, 
a court should ask the seven questions listed above in an effort to de-
termine whether waiving the walking rule would change golf into 
something it is not, whether it would invariably alter the competitive 
balance, or whether waiving the rule is administratively impossible. 
Do professional golfers train at walking? Although more golfers 
are starting to incorporate physical fitness routines into their regi-
men, most do not independently practice walking. They certainly do 
not practice walking to the extent that a NBA player practices mak-
ing baskets, or moving his feet on defense. They certainly do not 
practice walking to the extent that a major league baseball player 
practices hitting the ball. And they certainly do not practice walking 
to the extent that golfers practice putting or driving. Walking a golf 
course is not unique to golf. Rather, it is a skill that the majority of 
the population can and does perform. The answer to question one, 
then, suggests that riding a golf cart might not give a golfer a signifi-
cant advantage over her competitors. 
What is the link between success in walking and success in golf? 
Does walking in golf directly influence score? In one sense the an-
swer is no, because players get no strokes off their game for being 
good walkers. But it is more complicated than that. Does skill at 
 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (giving the standard for testing admissibility of 
scientific evidence). 
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walking without getting fatigued lead to an increased score? Here, as 
the Martin decision pointed out, it is certainly probative that even 
when players are permitted to ride carts, they generally choose to 
walk. However, one cannot ignore that golfing can be tiring, and 
riding a cart would lead to less fatigue. In the end, we must remem-
ber that this question focuses on whether less fatigue from riding a 
cart would invariably and always lead to an improved score. The an-
swer to the next question, whether riding a cart would place other 
athletes at a competitive disadvantage, must also be answered with 
the requisite level of generality. Although these are both difficult 
questions, perhaps the most difficult, the USGA or PGA likely can-
not demonstrate that riding a cart will invariably lead to a better 
score. Although possible, it is not certain, and when we proceed to 
the individualized analysis, we will be in a better position to evaluate 
the specific effects of a waiver of the walking rule in this case. 
Why do the PGA and USGA have the walking rule? There are 
two answers to this question. One is to inject an element of fatigue 
into the competition.207 The second is tradition. Neither is unimpor-
tant. As for fatigue, if we can imagine any possible situation where a 
golfer could ride a cart and still be fatigued, we should at least pro-
ceed to the individualized analysis stage. A court should also listen to 
the PGA’s and USGA’s argument that they have a large voice in de-
fining what is fundamental to their sport, and walking has always 
been a part of golf. In both Martin and Olinger, the PGA and 
USGA attempted to argue that walking made golf what it was, akin 
to the bases being ninety feet apart in baseball.  
Ultimately however, it is the court that must decide the answer 
to this question. This is no doubt odious to some. In a sense, were 
this approach to be applied, the governing body of a sport would no 
longer be in exclusive control of that sport. However, the PGA or 
USGA can no more make an element that discriminates against those 
with disability a fundamental part of their sport than it can exclude 
minorities. The Olinger opinion closes with the statement: “[T]he 
decision on whether the rules of the game should be adjusted to ac-
commodate [Olinger] is best left to those who hold the future of 
golf in trust.”208 With all due respect, this is wrong. The ADA is ex-
plicit that a court must make an independent evaluation of what 
 
 207. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250. 
 208. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007. 
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rules are essential. The USGA’s and PGA’s explanation and argu-
ments are evidence, but the court is the ultimate fact-finder on the 
issue. Congress decided as much when it passed the ADA without an 
exception for professional sports. At the end of the day, both the 
Olinger and Martin courts made the correct judgment that golfing is 
ultimately a game of shot making, and not walking. 
Independent of competitive advantage, would a modification of 
the walking rule change the way the game is played for all partici-
pants? Clearly it would not. Whether Casey Martin rides a cart or not 
does not have a direct effect on the fact that David Duvall or Tiger 
Woods are walking the course. Waiving the walking rule does not di-
rectly impact any other players in how they play their own game. Fi-
nally, what about the realistic administrative and financial burden of 
waiving the walking rule on a case-by-case basis? As discussed above, 
the Olinger opinion did not meet the ADA standard in answering 
this question. Although perhaps difficult, professional golf cannot 
demonstrate that it is impossible to deal with these cases as they 
come. Certainly, it is not unduly financially burdensome.209 
When all these factors are considered, it becomes evident that the 
walking rule is not incapable of being modified without transforming 
golf into something it is not, invariably causing competitive advan-
tage or disadvantage, or being unduly administratively burdensome. 
As such, the rule is capable of being modified without causing “fun-
damental” change to golf. The next question, then, is should the 
rule in fact be changed for Casey Martin or Ford Olinger? It is at this 
point, and only at this point, that a court should proceed to the indi-
vidualized analysis stage. 
Does walking a course give Ford Olinger or Casey Martin an ad-
vantage? Their respective medical evidence proves that it would not. 
Even the Olinger court essentially acknowledged as much.210 On this 
ground, then, the requested accommodation should be made. At the 
end of the day, Martin got the outcome correct and Olinger did not. 
 
 209. See Rick Horrow, Golf Business Soaring: The PGA Is Enjoying Business Growth, Fox 
Sports Biz Website, (visited Nov. 2, 2000) <http://www.foxsports.com/business/views/ 
z000405horrow1.sml> (discussing how PGA has been experiencing unprecedented business 
success, as evidenced by the fact that purses have risen from $69 million five years ago, to 
about $150 million this year). 
 210. “Ford Olinger must ride a golf cart to play, and even with a cart he is likely to be 
more fatigued at the day’s end than a healthy Tiger Woods or a healthy David Duvall.” Olin-
ger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 937. 
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The Supreme Court should realize this, and decide the case accord-
ingly. 
In sum, the intent of this proposed analysis is to strike a balance 
between the unique importance of equal competition in professional 
athletics and the importance of applying the ADA in a consistent 
manner that does not “ruin” professional sports. There are other 
ADA checks against fundamental change, both before and after the 
“fundamental alterations” or “undue burden” analyses. First, from 
the outset, not every person with a mental or physical impairment 
can bring an ADA suit; rather, they must be “disabled” within the 
meaning of the ADA definition. After Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkinburg 
and Sutton v. United Airlines,211 fewer individuals will qualify to 
bring ADA suits. Second, before the “fundamental alteration” and 
“undue burden” analyses, under both Title I and Title III, a profes-
sional athlete needs to prove that her requested accommodation is 
reasonable in the general sense, which means in the general run of 
cases.212 All of this notwithstanding, the heart of professional sports’ 
and every other industry’s protection against fundamental change is 
the fundamental alterations and undue burden analysis contained in 
the ADA. 
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The method of analysis proposed here is based on the belief that 
professional sports should not be exempted from the ADA in any 
blanket fashion. On a statutory level, this is not a particularly contro-
versial stance. The ADA must be applied equally to professional 
sports because Congress, when writing the ADA, did not say that it 
should not. 
History teaches us, however, that the lack of a textual exemption 
is not necessarily determinative. In Federal Baseball Club v. National 
League,213 the Supreme Court created a judicial exception for Major 
League Baseball to federal antitrust law. That exception was upheld 
in Flood v. Kuhn.214 In a manner which is eerily reminiscent of Olin-
ger, the Flood decision was long on baseball history (the opinion 
 
 211. For details on the Albertson’s and Sutton decisions, see supra note 46. 
 212. Johnson v. Gambrirus Co./Spoetezel Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 
1997). 
 213. 259 U.S. 200 (1921). 
 214. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
5WAT-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:45 PM 
1489] Why the ADA Will Not Ruin Professional Sports 
 1547 
cited the names of no less than eighty-nine famous baseball players), 
yet was criticized for engaging in some creative legal maneuvers to 
maintain baseball’s antitrust protection.215 Although the baseball an-
titrust exemption has been characterized as an anomaly, and is likely 
one that judges and legal scholars are not anxious to recreate, it does 
stand as an example of the judiciary protecting a professional sport 
without a statutory directive to do so. In short, both a judicially cre-
ated exception for professional sports, or an amendment to the ADA 
exempting professional sports, are possibilities that should be re-
jected. 
The unique role of competition in professional sports offers one 
rationale to justify special anti-discrimination treatment in this arena. 
Indeed, as the district court in Olinger offered, and the Seventh Cir-
cuit cited: 
Athletic competition presents ADA concerns different from those 
presented by the workplace. In the workplace, the pertinent inquiry 
is whether a particular otherwise qualified individual can perform 
the job if a reasonable accommodation is made to allow for the per-
son’s disability. The point of an athletic competition, in contrast, is 
to decide who, under conditions that are about the same for every-
one, can perform an assigned set of tasks better than (not as well 
as) any other competitor.216 
Some commentators, concerned that any modification of tightly-
monitored competition will ruin professional sports, opine that 
“[t]he [ADA] . . . has pushed sports . . . to the mouth of a very dark 
cave,”217 and the ADA “has fostered a spirit of entitlement that is 
suspicious of any standards that may exclude any person claiming 
disability.”218 
To say that the element of competition in professional sports 
mandates a special exemption both puts professional sports on too 
high of a pedestal and denigrates the importance of competition in 
other workplace and public accommodations situations. Is competi-
 
 215. See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, 
PROBLEMS 137 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that Flood rejected every premise upon which Federal 
Baseball was written, but still managed to uphold the exception). 
 216. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 937. 
 217. John Garrity, Taking One for the Team Battered by the Martin Case, Tim Finchem 
Nonetheless Deserves Respect, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 23, 1998, at 63. 
 218. J. Freedley Hunsicker, The Accommodation of Writing Disorders in Law School: A 
Lawyer’s View 27 J.L. & EDUC. 621, 622 (1998). 
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tion really more important in professional sports than it is in getting 
a job in a prestigious law firm and performing that job in an accept-
able fashion? Is the competition in professional sports different in any 
meaningful qualitative sense from securing a place in a top medical 
school and performing well enough to graduate? To cast any of these 
situations as anything less than a zero sum gain, where one person’s 
advantage is another’s disadvantage, is misguided. 
To be sure, there exists the danger that some court, somewhere, 
will get carried away and make a ruling that arguably disrupts the 
competitive balance of the sport. This danger exists, however, in all 
ADA cases and increases in industries where competition is keenest. 
Yet fear of a mistake is not a legitimate reason to close off an indus-
try. That is why there are appellate courts. This chance of mistake is 
preferable to the alternative: a world where the disabled can be dis-
criminated against in professional sports and not have an opportunity 
to vindicate their rights. 
Given their exclusivity and preeminent place in our society, 
strong ADA protection is particularly needed in the case of profes-
sional sports. Professional sports are virtual monopolies. An athlete 
who is being discriminated against on the basis of his disability will 
often not have any other viable career options. They do not have the 
option of going to a different, non-discriminating firm within the 
same industry who will make the accommodation. They will not be 
able to make the initial discriminator “pay” for his irrational behavior 
by giving their value to a different employer. 
Professional sports are especially dangerous hosts of discrimina-
tion. Unfortunately, this is borne out by their history. Baseball did 
not integrate until Jackie Robinson broke the color barrier for the 
Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947. The PGA had a provision in its charter 
requiring its members to be of the Caucasian race until 1961.219 As 
late as 1973, eighteen United States Congressmen sent a letter to 
the PGA complaining that a “form of subtle discrimination taints the 
image of the tournament and brings no credit to the world of profes-
sional golf.”220 No black man was invited to The Masters until 
1975.221 Indeed, many of the same arguments used to combat racial 
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integration in professional sports (it will ruin the sport, players do 
not agree with the changes) are present in the current disability de-
bate. 
Athletes are widely regarded as both role models and even he-
roes. As such, professional sports are an especially appropriate vehicle 
to carry out the ADA’s goals of combating perceptions of disabled 
individuals as second-class citizens. Whether he intends to be or even 
wants to be, a disabled athlete competing at a sport’s highest level 
can serve as an example to disabled children nationwide.222 In addi-
tion, accommodating disabled individuals in professional sports sets 
an example for lower-level sports organizations, from intercollegiate 
athletics all the way down to youth recreation leagues. Likewise, ex-
empting professional sports from the ADA would send the harmful 
message that disabled individuals cannot be competitive and produc-
tive at the highest levels of individual endeavor. 
The ADA is the disabled community’s equivalent of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. It is their civil rights statute, and they have no 
other federal protection. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cen-
ter, Inc.,223 the Supreme Court found that disabled individuals were 
not part of a protected class; thus they were not entitled to height-
ened scrutiny when the government or a state actor regulated based 
on disability.224 Instead, the Equal Protection Clause only requires 
the rationality test.225 Constitutional protection is therefore not a vi-
able option for a disabled plaintiff. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Martin and Olinger, the ADA announced its arrival at profes-
sional sport’s doorstep. Some, fearing that professional sports will be 
fundamentally and forever changed, would shut the door. Doing so 
is not morally right, nor is it lawful. There is nothing germane to the 
professional sporting world that gives it favored status in the eyes of 
the ADA. Congress realized as much when it passed the ADA with-
out an exemption for professional sports. A reasoned, consistent 
form of the “fundamental alterations” and “undue burden” analyses 
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will assure that the ADA’s promise—that only accommodations that  
are reasonable and do not fundamentally change an entity—can be a 
reality. 
Martin and Olinger started the process, but they do not provide 
the coherent analytical framework necessary for deciding future ADA 
cases involving professional athletics. Both fall short on their factual 
analyses and muddy the waters as to the placement and propriety of 
an individualized analysis. In contrast, the set of factual questions 
this article provides will allow a reviewing court to determine 
whether a rule is capable of being modified without fundamentally 
altering the sport—a factual review that the Martin and Olinger 
cases does not give. The reviewing court should only proceed to the 
individualized analysis if the league cannot prove that the rule is in-
capable of being modified without giving competitive advantage or 
disturbing the essence of the game in some other manner. 
Although professional sports do not deserve preferential treat-
ment under the ADA, it is undeniable that professional sports, at 
times, involve special circumstances that will make ADA cases diffi-
cult to decide. Giving the league an opportunity to prove prior to 
the individualized analysis that the rule is incapable of being modi-
fied is a tool to “accommodate” professional sports’ uniqueness. The 
individualized analysis should be the last question, not the first. Al-
though it is impossible to look into the future and predict every chal-
lenge that will come, this article gives a method of analysis that does 
justice to these special circumstances in a manner that is consistent 
with the way the ADA is applied to other employers and 
owner/operators of public accommodations. 
